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 SUMMARY 
 
The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the  
 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan  
 
Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential  
 
administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of  
 
Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing  
 
the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the  
 
volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely  
 
Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model,  
 
this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met,  
 
why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan  
 
Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola  
 
or Afghanistan?”  As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a  
 
written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant  
 
part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted  
 
the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US  
 
Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that  
 
President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real  
 
significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such  
 
reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and  
 
Afghanistan in arming RENAMO.  Was the United States Government still trapped in the  
 
“Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the  
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same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of  
 
Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government  
 
bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way?  A significant part of this study is  
 
devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians  
 
(both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making  
 
process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the  
 
doctrine indirectly applied through third parties?  In 1989 when the Reagan  
 
Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their  
 
objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other  
 
factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 vowing to fulfill his 1980  
 
campaign promises, which were to become his Administration’s policies, namely to  
 
contain the spread of, and rollback, expansionist Soviet style communism,  
 
particularly in African, Asian, and South American states (then referred to as the  
 
Third World).  According to the National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which  
 
will be studied, the strategy to implement these policies was to be accomplished by: 1)  
 
Providing covert and overt aid to the anti-communist resistance (guerrilla or insurgent)  
 
forces, 2) which would enable them to destabilize the Soviet Union backed/supported  
 
governments. His doctrine toward rolling back Communism would eventually be called  
 
the Reagan Doctrine, which will be discussed further in this dissertation.   
 
    Portugal colonized present day Angola and Mozambique in the 1400s. In the  
 
1960s and 1970s anti-colonial uprisings began in these colonies.  With the rising casualty  
 
and monetary costs, the Portuguese Army became dissatisfied with the colonial costs    
 
and initiated a coup d’état in 1974. After 400 years of colonial rule, Portugal granted  
 
independence to Mozambique on June 1, 1975.  The Marxist-Leninist Front for the  
 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party became the governing body, but almost  
 
instantaneously a civil war broke out between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The Soviet  
 
Union and Cuba sent military troops as advisers to the Mozambique Armed Forces. The  
 
white-minority ruled Rhodesian and South African Governments supported the resistance  
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movements to prevent black guerilla assistance to the Rhodesian guerillas.  In 1977  
 
Mozambique and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year friendship treaty.   
 
    By 1989 the Reagan Doctrine, as applied toward the southern African region   
 
resulted in stunning political victories. President Reagan could claim credit for the  
 
Accords governing the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet troops from Angola, the  
 
independence of Namibia from the South African Government Mandate, and the  
 
beginning of the end of apartheid in South Africa.  General Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of  
 
Staff of the South African Defense Forces called President Reagan one of the most  
 
important figures in southern African history, along with Prime Minister John Vorster,  
 
Prime Minister (later State President) P.W. Botha and Namibian politician Dirk Mudge.  
 
(Geldenhuys, 1994, xii) 
 
Using the Rational Actor model, the decision to apply the Reagan Doctrine  
 
against the Marxist-Leninist oriented FRELIMO Mozambique government should have  
 
been quite simple, because this would have been in support of the Reagan Doctrine. But  
 
the Doctrine was not applied (or at least not with the veracity) as it was applied toward  
 
the Communist governments in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. As an example anti- 
 
government movements in Afghanistan and Angola received high technology weapons  
 
from the United States, such as the Stinger missile, but the Mozambique resistance did  
 
not. Therefore, an investigation is called for to determine 1) whether or not the Reagan  
 
Doctrine was applied to Mozambique, and 2) despite there being no “standards” for the  
 
Reagan Doctrine, why was there no overt lethal arming of RENAMO. . In addition,  
 
because of underlying governmental bureaucratic political posturing and possible interest  
 
group pressures, an examination of the implementation of the Reagan Doctrine toward  
 
 14 
Mozambique using the bureaucratic political model is called for.  
 
  This study will apply Graham Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic politics model to answer  
 
the question on why there was a decision to only implement a modified form (if it could  
 
even be called that) of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full blown  
 
effort. Graham Allison’s (1971) Essence of Decision was about President John  
 
Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crises. Allison analyzed Kennedy’s handling  
 
of the crises and came to the conclusion that government action and decision are not  
 
chosen, but come about as a result of compromise, conflict, and confusion with diverse  
 
interests and unequal influence. Political interactions between actors, including the  
 
President, the Congress as a whole and certain portions of Congress, (i.e. the  
 
Congressional Black Caucus) will be examined. Interactions between the President, the  
 
State Department and non-governmental special interest groups will be studied. The  
 
impact of these organizational routines and interests and the individual beliefs will be  
 
examined, to determine how the decision was made. In addition, the role that foreign  
 
government entities bodies had the decision-making process will be reviewed, because of  
 
sensitivities of foreign policy. Due to South Africa’s apartheid policy, did the United  
 
States (US) Government go through foreign governments to aid the Mozambique  
 
National Resistance (RENAMO), so as not to bring scrutiny by anti-apartheid  
 
organizations? 
 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem  
 
    The literature reviewed does not include any studies on decision-making process  
 
vis- a -vis Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic political model,  
 
this study will attempt to answer why:  Even when all the prerequisites were met, why  
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was there a decision to only implement a (very) modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in  
 
Mozambique, instead of a full blown effort, such as in Angola or Afghanistan?  The  
 
significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such  
 
reluctance to apply with the veracity as compared to Angola.  Were special interests or  
 
lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? Did  
 
the decision include aid sent through third parties to provide a plausible denial for the US  
 
Governments support for RENAMO?  A significance of this is how much influence the  
 
bureaucracy has on important national security decision-making. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
  
  Most of the secondary literature on the proposed thesis statement regarding President  
 
Reagan and the Reagan Doctrine is widely available to the public in the US and foreign  
 
countries. Literature on the Reagan Doctrine focuses on the doctrine’s planning,  
 
development, execution and results. Material on the actual implementation and conduct  
 
of the Reagan Doctrine primarily focuses on the Afghanistan and Angolan insurgencies.  
 
Material on the doctrine as applied to Mozambique has not been widely studied and  
 
consequently is not as available as on such insurgencies as Afghanistan, Angola and  
 
Nicaragua. 
 
1.3.1 Primary Sources 
 
   There are many Reagan Administration documents that are still classified and not  
 
available to the general public. Until these documents are fully declassified and  
 
released academic conclusions will have to be drawn. 
 
There have been numerous books, articles and other media written about the  
 
 Mozambique Civil War, apartheid South Africa (from 1948-until the collapse), South  
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Africa and its foreign relations with Southern African states, the Namibian struggle for  
 
independence, the fall of the Soviet Union, the Soviet involvement in Africa and  
 
Southern Africa, the Cold War (1945-1991), and the Reagan and (George H.W.) Bush  
 
Administrations, especially compilations of their Presidential documents. The material  
 
reflects all viewpoints across the political spectrum. Several books and material were  
 
written by high-level officials who have an interest in how the events are perceived and  
 
how their positions are recorded in the historical setting. 
 
    Primary source (official government documents and recordings) include the  
 
study, analysis, and interpretation of documents from open sources.  Documents that  
 
were studied are available from the Presidential libraries and other government files, such  
 
as the Pentagon library.  These items will be studied for appropriate content and bias  
 
toward a particular political viewpoint. Personal bias by the author will have to be noted.  
 
This is important because many of the actors would want to be portrayed or have  
 
themselves portrayed in the best possible light, especially if any actors were to seek a  
 
higher office. They would not want their actions to come back and haunt them or be  
 
second guessed by historians. The intended audience for documents will also be studied  
 
because many actors and organizations were oriented toward a particular ideology or  
 
voting bloc (conservative, liberal, etc).  
 
1.3.1.2 Official Government Documents 
 
The US foreign policy in the 1980’s was set by the President and the Congress.  
 
President Reagan articulated the nation’s security interests and proposed  
 
policy in the National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM). These Memoranda were  
 
published as the need for a policy decision was required. The President then issued  
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National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) to implement his policies. These  
 
documents were the foundation for the Administration’s policy and strategy to implement  
 
its policies.  
 
1.3.1.3 Secondary sources used.  
 
   Secondary sources to be studied and analyzed will include newspaper and journal  
 
articles, books, and magazine articles from the appropriate time periods mentioned in the  
 
thesis.  Most of the senior governmental officials in the Reagan Administration wrote  
 
about their experiences during the time period 1981-1989. Memoirs were written by for  
 
example: President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, Secretary of State  
 
George Shultz, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, The Director of the CIA  
 
Robert Gates, the National Security Advisors William Clark and McFarlane, etc. Soviet  
 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev also wrote several books on his time as the USSR  
 
leader.  
 
   All written articles have the possibility of reflecting the authors biased political  
 
viewpoints toward the situation. All material will be drawn from open sources. In  
 
addition several of the works were written before any of the relevant material was  
 
declassified and subsequently may not be accurate. Likewise, there may also be  
 
speculation of what some writers wrote because the material is still classified as of this  
 
date. 
 
   Some of the more prominent secondary sources available on the subject include Former  
 
Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) Chester Crocker’s (1992) book High Noon  
 
in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, which is mostly about  
 
South Africa, Cuba, Namibia, and Angola describes how he was able to bring all parties  
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to the negotiating table, which resulted in the New York Accords in December 1988.   
 
These accords governed the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.  In addition to the  
 
Reagan Doctrine, Constructive Engagement was to become a diplomatic term, which  
 
emphasized South African security. This was also a factor with Mozambique. If South  
 
Africa was not secure, its neighbors would not be secure.  Mr. Crocker was the Assistant  
 
Secretary for African Affairs and the point man responsible for actually executing  
 
President Reagan’s foreign policy toward Southern Africa from 1981 until 1989. His  
 
book demonstrates that sometimes the biggest battles were between US Governmental  
 
agencies in “turf battles.” 
 
Former Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen, who succeeded Chester  
 
Crocker as the Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) during the George H.W.  
 
Bush Administration authored Intervening in Africa, which describes his experiences  
 
both on the National Security Council (NSC), and as the Assistant Secretary.  
 
Some of his comments directly contradict what Chester Crocker has said about  
 
RENAMO. 
 
Other source material focuses on the study of US and USSR economic, military 
  
and political strategy during the Cold War.  Examples of such material follow.  
 
Norman Friedman’s (2000) The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold  
 
War, describes the US’ strategy toward the Soviet Union, in general, during the Cold  
 
War. He does not cover regional strategy in any specific detail, just a general overview. It  
 
is an excellent premier on the strategic level of thinking of sovereign states. 
 
Daniel R. Kempton’s (1989) Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa: The  
 
National Liberation Movement Connection describes the Soviet Union’s political strategy 
 
 19 
 toward the Southern African region. Kempton explains how the Soviet Union decided  
 
which national liberation movement to back in the region, which movement would  
 
become the “vanguard” party. The FRELIMO party, for example was identified as the  
 
“vanguard” party in Mozambique.  
 
Kenneth Mokoena (1993) has edited South Africa and the United States: The  
 
Unclassified History, reflects many USG that were declassified as of the  
 
date. Since 1993 many of these partly classified documents were fully declassified.  
 
While these historical documents are still relevant in this form, there has been more  
 
information released for a better understanding of decision-making process 
 
From the Soviet side Yuri Pavlov’s (1994), The Cuban-Soviet Alliance 1959-1991  
 
describes the Cuban involvement in Southern Africa in greater detail than most books.  
 
Mr. Pavlov was a Soviet specialist in Latin American Affairs during the time period. This  
 
book was written after the fall of the Soviet Union. He would have had knowledge of  
 
Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa and have been knowledgeable of Soviet/ Cuban  
 
strategy toward Southern Africa. This is important because it is well known and  
 
considered that the Cubans were considered proxies for the USSR in cases like Angola. 
 
There have been numerous books written about Mozambique and RENAMO,   
 
including Alex Vines’ (1991) RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique which  
 
describes RENAMO’s has terror campaign in Mozambique. Vines traces the origins of  
 
RENAMO from its founding by Rhodesia to its eventual sponsorship by the South  
 
African government. While pointing out FRELIMOs shortcomings, it also makes a case  
 
against RENAMO for the atrocities committed. Vine’s book was cited by Assistant  
 
Secretary of State Chester Crocker to document findings of how the US State Department  
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came out against RENAMO. In addition to these specific books, there are a number of  
 
books written by authors that participated in the South African invasion of Angola  
 
(Operation Savannah) These are mostly oriented toward the tactical and operational  
 
levels of war and not the strategic level. 
 
   There is much material that describes the Reagan Doctrine and while it may not have  
 
been written specifically about Mozambique, such books as Steve Coll’s (2004) the  
 
Ghost Wars gives an excellent overview of how the Reagan Doctrine was applied to  
 
Afghanistan. While it was applied to Afghanistan, the similarities between Afghanistan,  
 
Angola and other countries would have been similar. After all the objective was the  
 
same: To drive the Soviet Union out of the sovereign nations of Afghanistan and Angola.  
 
1.4. Analytical Framework and Methodology 
  
 1.4.1   Analytical Framework: 
  
The bureaucratic politics model is used.  This is also called the  
 
Governmental Politics model.  This model was developed by Graham Allison’s (1971) 
 
Allison’s publication, as indicated earlier, dealt with President John Kennedy’s handling  
 
of the Cuban Missile Crises in 1962. Allison analyzed President Kennedy’s handling of  
 
the crises and came to the conclusion that government action and decision are not chosen,  
 
but come about as a result of compromise, conflict, and confusion with diverse interests  
 
and unequal influence.  The bureaucratic model does not focus on a single actor (in the  
 
case of this thesis the main actor would be President Reagan), but on many actors, who  
 
are viewed as the players. The bureaucratic model focuses on the individuals within a  
 
government and actions taken among them.  The US Government is made up of   career  
 
civil servants, elected officials and political appointee individuals, who may be pursuing  
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widely differing, maybe conflicting goals.  Conflicts among these personnel may or may  
 
not lead toward achieving the strategic objective, which is political output. This is  
 
because the decisions leading to the recommendations are so numerous that one  
 
organization may not be able to handle it and the process is decentralized. The process  
 
then becomes as, Allison (1971) describes it, one of bargaining, pulling, and hauling. 
 
    The US Government, itself does not make theories or process decisions, the people  
 
who make up the governmental bodies (leaders and bureaucrats) do. As previously  
 
stated these persons may be elected, appointed, or career government officials who  
 
bring their beliefs and routines with them. Very often these actors are also susceptible  
 
to other (or new) influences, such as lobbyists, the media, and other actors. This is  
 
especially prominent in the US Congress, whose members are responsible to their  
 
constituents and are in need of funds to get reelected.  
  
   The primary characteristic of bureaucratic politics is that the decisions are best  
 
understood as a result of bargaining among the actors in the decision-making process,  
 
resulting in compromises. Whether or not a compromise was reached will be examined,  
 
and if so the results that the bureaucracy played in it. 
 
1.4.2 Research Methodology  
 
This study applies predominantly a qualitative approach and presents a descriptive  
 
analysis.  The emphasis on qualitative research is on methods of observation,  
 
interviewing and analysis of selected primary (governmental) and secondary  
 
documents. This study will rely exclusively on primary and secondary sources,  
 
such as previously described official government documents. 
 
The study draws upon data from both primary and secondary sources as described in the  
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literature review. The Reagan Administration left office in 1989, which is over 20 years  
 
ago, and the official government material is starting to become available to researchers  
 
through automatic declassification.  
 
1.5 Conceptual Clarification 
 
The following terms related to the study are now defined. 
 
Reagan Doctrine, according to: Evans and Newnham (1998) 464-465 is a term  
 
used to describe the foreign policy of the Reagan Administration from 1980 to  
 
1988.  This Doctrine was never officially proclaimed as a series of coherent  
 
policy initiatives in the sense of the earlier Truman or Nixon Doctrine. The  
 
essence of the Reagan Doctrine was the active destabilization of selected target states  
 
held to be following policies and ideologies which were Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet.  
 
Further definitions of the Reagan Doctrine follow in the text.  
 
    Modified Reagan Doctrine:  the full Reagan Doctrine was generally considered as  
 
one where full measures would have been applied, such as Afghanistan, Angola, and  
 
Nicaragua. Arming the insurgents would be a good example of the full Reagan Doctrine.  
 
Not sending government sponsored arms to insurgents would be a good example of a  
 
modified doctrine. 
 
   In the Cold War period the Soviet Union had reasserted its dominance over the  
 
Eastern European satellite states with invasions of, for example, Hungary in 1956 and  
 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. After the latter, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev declared  
 
that the Soviet Union claimed the right to intervene in Warsaw Pact nations to protect  
 
their people and orthodox communism. This became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine  
 
(Friedman, 2000, 453-454) 
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The term Cold War according to Evans and Newnham (1998, 70) was a term  
 
coined by the American journalist H.B. Swope and subsequently popularized by Walter  
 
Lippman which was used to describe the state of “neither war nor peace between the  
 
Western (non-communist) and Eastern (communist) blocs after the Second World War. 
 
Communism is here defined as a political ideology aimed at the common  
 
ownership of land and capital and elimination of the coercive power of the state:  
 
Evans and Newnham (1998, 86) 
 
Vanguard Party refers to a socialist/communist party that received the attention of  
 
the Soviet Union, because of their strict adherence to Soviet style (version) of  
 
Marxist-Leninism 
 
Evans and Newnham, (1998, 252) defines insurgency is an armed insurrection or  
 
rebellion against an established government in a state. 
 
A civil war is protracted internal violence aimed at securing control of the  
 
political and apparatus of a state Evans and Newnham (1998, 64). 
 
According to Evans and Newnham (1998, 546-547) trusteeship refers to the  
 
notion of international supervision of colonial territories. The purpose was to prevent  
 
annexation of territories previously controlled by defeated states.  South Africa controlled  
 
South West Africa (Namibia) from 1919 until 1989. 
 
The Rational Actor Model as defined by Dr. Henry Damerow of the Union County  
 
College (New Jersey) Department of Economics, Government and History on their  
 
website as requiring: 
 
1) Problem recognition and Definition 
2) Goal Selection 
3) Identification of Alternatives 
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4) Choice. Selection of the single alternative with the best chance of achieving the 
desired goal(s) 
 
1. 6.  Importance of the Study 
 
      This study will fill a knowledge gap with regards to the Reagan Doctrine  
 
application toward Mozambique. Most Reagan Doctrine studies concentrate on  
 
Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. The most important reason for this study is that it  
 
determined how and why bureaucratic politics influenced the Reagan Administration to  
 
modify the Reagan Doctrine implementation toward Mozambique. The study  
 
determined that President Reagan did urge FRELIMO to negotiate with RENAMO.  
 
The study examined which individuals in the US Government acted in accordance with  
 
their particular positions within the bureaucracy or in the best interests of the US  
 
national security interests. This study also provides insights into the national (or  
 
strategic) level decision-making process needed to support an insurgency. Another  
 
reason for the study, is that even though an insurgency may, in terms of US’ foreign  
 
policy, meet the prerequisites for foreign assistance, other factors may conspire to  
 
prevent the movement from receiving the foreign aid that is required or desired. The US  
 
Government engages insurgencies covertly and overtly. An attempt is made to answer  
 
the question: Did the US Government funnel aid to RENAMO secretly through third  
 
parties for plausible denial?  
 
   Finally, this study can also be viewed as a national security decision-making study of  
 
implementing the best policy action based upon recommendations. The study can be  
 
viewed from conception to implementation. The final reason for this study is to  
 
examine what, if any implications that US policy toward Mozambique during the  
 
Reagan Administration still lasts today. 
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1.7. Scope and Limitations 
 
    The scope of this study is limited to the time frame that President Reagan was in  
 
office (1981-1989). Events that happened before and after his administration will be  
 
examined as necessary to relate to this thesis statement. The study concentrates on the  
 
Reagan Doctrine decision-making process as it was applied toward the African state of  
 
Mozambique. Comparisons with the Reagan Doctrine application toward Afghanistan,  
 
Angola, Nicaragua and other states will be made as appropriate. This study will  
 
primarily focus on the US national security and foreign policy decision- 
 
making process. 
 
1.8. Summary and content of each subsequent chapter 
 
   The following is the summary of each thesis chapter:     
 
1.8.1 The Strategic Situation in Southern Africa until 1981 
 
        Chapter 2 contains information on the key state actors involved and their  
 
involvement the strategic situation in southern Africa from Mozambique’s June 1975  
 
independence until January 1981 when President Reagan took office. The strategic  
 
situation is important as it set the stage for why certain Reagan Administration decisions  
 
were or were not made and most importantly why they were made. This background  
 
chapter will primarily focus on the political/ military situation in Mozambique,  
 
Soviet/Cuban support for the FRELIMO vanguard political party, and the ongoing civil  
 
war.  The reasons for the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO are covered.  
 
The situation in the countries surrounding Mozambique and their involvement regarding  
 
the situation in Mozambique is covered. 
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1.8.2 The Reagan Doctrine and its Formulation 
 
     Chapter 3 details how the Reagan Doctrine came into existence as a result  
 
of the administration’s desire to contain and eventually reverse the spread of  
 
Communism. President Reagan’s NSDM and NSDD toward southern Africa,  
 
particularly, in relation to Mozambique, are analyzed.  These directives need to be  
 
studied in depth because they describe how and why the doctrine developed and was  
 
implemented. The role of the US State Department and Defense Department bureaucratic  
 
actors in developing the Reagan Doctrine are examined. The effects that non- 
 
governmental organizations (specifically think tanks and lobbyists) are examined. Think  
 
tanks and lobbyists are particularly important, since many governmental officials either:  
 
a) come into presidential administrations to help make and execute policy or b) leave the  
 
presidential administrations and join the think tanks as researchers or lobbyists. 
 
1.8.3 The Congressional and Non-Governmental Response to the Reagan Doctrine 
 
       Chapter 4 analyzes the Reagan Doctrine and the U.S. Congress and  
 
non-governmental agencies.  Congress controls the funding, enacts laws, and provides  
 
oversight. The Congressional effects on the implementation of the Reagan Doctrine is  
 
examined. The key actors would be the members of Congress, congressional staff  
 
members and the professional staffers. Certain congressional committees, such as the  
 
Armed Services and Foreign Relations will be examined. Bureaucrats’ sympathies with  
 
and toward FRELIMO and RENAMO are examined.  Interactions between the Congress  
 
and the Executive Branch are discussed. Bureaucratic politics in the form of  
 
Congressional oversight will be examined. 
 
The response of non-governmental agencies, particularly think tanks and  
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lobbyists are examined and analyzed. Powerful right wing think tanks, particularly the  
 
Heritage Foundation waged an all out lobbying effort to fully implement the Reagan  
 
Doctrine in Mozambique and fully support RENAMO. The key actors are the think tank  
 
members. This is because of reasons, such as explained earlier.  
 
Organizational influences from, for example TransAfrica and the National Association  
 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is also studied. Mozambique’s  
 
influence on African-American organizations and actors are examined. This is because  
 
many of these organizations were involved in the fight against South Africa’s apartheid  
 
Policies. Many African-American organizations did not support RENAMO, simply  
 
because South African Government supported RENAMO. Foreign governments lobby  
 
too. These actors as constituencies will be studied. 
 
1.8.4 The Reagan Doctrine and the Executive Branch 
   
 Chapter 5 analyzes the Executive Office of the President, the NSC, the Central  
 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense and Department of State’s role in  
 
recommending doctrine strategy and implementation. These departments contain the true  
 
bureaucrats (both political appointees and career civil servants) Materiel aid to the anti- 
 
communist forces, particularly high technology weapons transfers (such as arms and the  
 
Stinger missiles), was a great source of intra and interdepartmental friction and tension.  
 
Materiel aid also had international repercussions, is examined. The impact of  
 
the Iran-Contra scandal is examined. The Iran-Contra scandal fallout had more to do with  
 
the collapse of the Reagan Doctrine and the bureaucratic approaches to the  
 
Socialist/communist countries than is given credit for. The Iran-Contra crises forced a  
 
great turnover of Reagan Administration officials through resignations and the judicial  
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process. 
 
1.8.5 Analysis of the Reasons for Modified Reagan Doctrine Implementation toward 
Mozambique 
       
 Chapter 6 culminates with an analysis on how bureaucratic politics influenced  
 
President Reagan’s decision to implement a modified doctrine toward Mozambique and  
 
the strategic consequences in Mozambique and southern Africa.  
 
1.9 Summary   
 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the research thesis on the question of  
 
why, despite meeting prerequisites for implementation, the Reagan Doctrine was 
 
not fully implemented toward Mozambique and RENAMO. A brief synopsis of the  
 
research will be covered. Recommendations are made to the process that could result  
 
In a better decision-making process for future scenarios. Some suggestions for further 
 
areas of study as it relates to questions that develop out of this study will be made. Some  
 
of these questions will deal with way the Soviet Union acted toward sub-Saharan Black  
 
Africa. Other possible research questions will be about how the USG interacted with sub- 
 
Saharan Africa. 
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Chapter 2  
 
The Strategic Situation in the Southern African Region until 1981 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
     A complete understanding of President Ronald Reagan’s policy towards  
 
southern Africa and, specifically, Mozambique cannot be properly understood  
 
without a thorough understanding of the southern Africa’s economic, political,  
 
diplomatic and military strategic situation that would eventually lead to his national  
 
security decision directives and other key decisions toward the region.  Also how  
 
governmental legitimacy would be determined is important. This would be the key to  
 
receiving aid. The situation in Southern Africa until President Reagan took office on  
 
January 20, 1981 could easily be described as volatile, chaotic and politically unstable  
 
due to many factors including:  
 
• the apartheid government of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
• the South African Liberation movements and their fight against apartheid. The 
African National Congress (ANC) would use Mozambique as a staging area for 
operations against the RSA government until 1984. 
• the military and economic sanctions against the apartheid RSA 
• South Africa’s destabilization efforts against the majority ruled Front-Line States 
• South Africa’s war against Cuban/Soviet combat troops and advisors in Angola 
• Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, and the 25 April 1974 
Portuguese coup, 
• Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of  Independence (UDI) and the effect of 
Zimbabwean independence on Mozambique and 
• The subsequent wars of national liberation and civil wars in Angola and 
Mozambique.   
 
The political environment in the region was unstable and constantly evolving. All of  
 
these factors contributed to the southern African regions volatility, instability and also to  
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the strategic importance to of the region to the USG strategy against the Soviet Union. 
 
2. 2 Rules for Revolution 
 
     Former South African Defense Chief Jannie Geldenhuys (1994) writes in his memoirs  
 
At the Front that the insurgency in southern Africa as well as in other parts of the Third  
 
World focused on legitimacy of the government and the insurgents. Each struggled to be  
 
seen as the authentic representative of the people. While this applied to all  
 
insurgencies/counter-insurgencies, some of the important points about the FRELIMO- 
 
RENAMO civil war were: 
 
• A revolutionary war is a political war 
 
• The aim of both sides in a revolutionary war is to win the support of the 
population, their approval, sympathy and active participation 
 
• The government must win the political initiative by propagating a more attractive   
             cause than that offered by the insurgent 
 
• The danger of complacency (a refusal to acknowledge the real situation) must be  
            avoided before and during a revolution 
 
• The existence of an outstanding intelligence organization is essential 
 
• In revolutionary warfare, bureaucratic delays are as dangerous as subversion itself 
the best counter-measure to a revolution-is good government (Geldenhuys, 1994, 
87-88) 
 
   These rules are important to keep in mind as the legitimacy of the RENAMO guerillas  
 
was constantly called into question by the U.S. State Department and other agencies,  
 
despite the fact that RENAMO had a Manifesto and had some popularity among the  
 
population. This was not proven until 1992 when RENAMO, while losing the elections,  
 
won 35% of the popular vote (Cohen, 2000, 181-183).  
 
Legitimacy of the guerilla movement was a key factor in the decision of the Reagan  
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Administration in giving aid. It is important to keep these factors in mind as the other  
 
actors struggled to keep or pull Mozambique in their respective orbit. It is also important  
 
to understand the importance of intelligence, as the CIA was in charge of covert  
 
operations when directed by proper authority. 
.  
2.3 The Key State Actors and political figures in the southern African region. 
 
  A short understanding of the major state and non-state actors and their roles, means and  
 
strategic objectives in the southern African region is needed to understand the situation  
 
as it evolved from the mid 1970s when Portugal underwent a political coup d’état and  
 
resulted in the decolonization of Angola and Mozambique to when Ronald Reagan  
 
became president in January1981.   
 
2.3.1 Cuba   
 
Cuba’s strategic objective was to advance the Socialist/ Communist  
 
revolution in Africa and other countries, especially in Latin America “to  
 
promote other Cubas.” (Gleijeses, 2002, 202). For Cuba only through armed struggle  
 
could Latin Americans attain social justice and national sovereignty (Gleijeses, 2002, 22)  
 
Cuba had an active presence in third world Africa and Central America spreading the  
 
revolution. Under Cuban President Fidel Castro, Cuba sent military advisors and  
 
eventually combat troops to sub-Saharan Africa, notably Angola and Ethiopia.  During  
 
the Angolan civil war, Cuban troops battled the UNITA and Front for the National  
 
Liberation of Angola guerrilla movements to help bring about Agostinho Neto’s Marxist- 
 
Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party to power on  
 
November 11, 1975.  After the successful installation of the Neto government, the  
 
Cuban’s objective focused on providing security for Angola and the Neto government. 
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From October 1975, the Cubans battled South African troops and  
 
UNITA guerrillas in Angola and South West Africa (Namibia).  The first was Operation  
 
Carlota, supposedly launched in response to South Africa’s Operation Savannah. The  
 
overall objective for South Africa was to have a government in Luanda that supported  
 
South Africa and would not allow operations against the RSA. It was  
 
estimated the at the height of the conflicts over 50,000 Cuban troops were deployed to  
 
Angola. The numbers ranged from 20,000 in 1978 to the 50,000 in 1988 (Diggins, 2007,  
 
244) Castro’s Cuba also supplied military weapons to Angola and Mozambique to give  
 
the Marxist-Leninist governments indigenous force the ability to fight the guerrillas.  
 
After 1975 Cuba had military advisors in Mozambique to advise the FRELIMO Armed  
 
Forces on defending against South African aggression, destabilization, and the RENAMO  
 
guerrillas fighting to overthrow FRELIMO. When President Ronald Reagan was  
 
inaugurated in January 1981 the Cubans were very involved in Angola, Mozambique,  
 
Ethiopia and other countries in southern Africa both with military and civilian advisors  
 
and foreign aid. Cuban and Soviet pilots allegedly flew many of the MiG aircraft and  
 
taught the Mozambican personnel in weapons use and counterinsurgency doctrine.  
 
(Nelson, 1984, 236-238)  There were also reportedly a 1,000 Cuban military advisors in  
 
Mozambique, assisting the FRELIMO army and that the Cuban military engineers had  
 
built the military airfields near Nicola and Beira (Nelson, 1984, 271-272) 
 
   Therefore getting the Cuban military and Cuban influence out of Sub-Saharan Africa,  
 
in order to promote southern African regional security and stability became a top priority  
 
for the Reagan Administration after it took office in1981. President Reagan believed that  
 
the security of the region would only be improved if Cuba withdrew its military  
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forces, restoring a balance of power in the region, and providing security for South  
 
Africa. As will be seen this was easier said than done. 
 
2.3.2 Mozambique  
 
During the time that Portugal ruled Mozambique as a colony,  
 
FRELIMO’s strategic objective was to gain independence from Portugal by engaging in a  
 
classical guerrilla style war and eventually establish an independent state. The state was  
 
to become a “Marxist-Leninist State based upon the principles of scientific socialism  
 
(Norval, 1988, 40) The People’s Republic of China had originally provided aid to the  
 
FRELIMO movement. After the April 1974 coup in Portugal and the subsequent Lusaka  
 
Accords, FRELIMO’s objective was to consolidate the gains of the revolution by  
 
nationalizing the means of production, (Hanlon, 1993, 22) The Lusaka Accords can be  
 
considered part of the starting of opposition to the FRELIMO party, because the accords  
 
gave power to FRELIMO, without the benefit of popular multi-party elections (Cain,  
 
1985, 38) Until June 1975, the colony of Mozambique was part of Greater Portugal. After  
 
June 1975, the Portuguese Government totally abandoned Mozambique and when  
 
independence came, FRELIMO did not have the managerial assets or experienced  
 
bureaucracy to govern the newly independent state.  
 
Mozambique was one of the poorer countries in Africa not because it lacked  
 
natural resources, nor because Portugal left it undeveloped, but rather because Portugal  
 
actively underdeveloped it (Hanlon, 1993, 22) Portugal did this by not involving the  
 
indigenous population in the government. The Portuguese ran everything in the colony,  
 
including the important bureaucracy. But in June 1975, Mozambique with FRELIMO,  
 
under President Samora Machel became a sovereign state, and soon after, the civil war  
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began between FRELIMO and RENAMO began, as Rhodesia’s national interest  
 
demanded that the new FRELIMO government in Mozambique be tied up fighting an  
 
insurgency, so that the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front not have a safe haven and not be able to  
 
effectively operate against the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. Cuba sent military advisors  
 
to Mozambique to train FRELIMO on internal security. 
 
Both the US, under the Ford Administration and the Union of Soviet Socialist  
 
Republics (USSR) established diplomatic relations with Mozambique immediately after  
 
the June 1975 independence. After independence FRELIMO had to then battle the  
 
RENAMO guerrillas for control of the government in Maputo and for control of the  
 
countryside. In 1977 the Mozambique Government entered into a 20-year treaty of  
 
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. FRELIMO also entered into similar  
 
agreements with Cuba, Bulgaria, East Germany, North Korea (Nelson, 1984, 46) The  
 
Mozambique Government also sought membership in the USSR controlled Council of  
 
Mutual Economic Assistance. Mozambique provided safe havens and sanctuary to the  
 
African National Congress for their raids into South Africa. Samora Machel vowed that  
 
Mozambique and the African National Congress (ANC) would “stand shoulder to  
 
shoulder until apartheid fell.” (Nelson, ed, 1984, 251) However as we will see, after  
 
Nkomati, this would not be. 
 
FRELIMO led Mozambique essentially went from a war of national  
 
liberation against Portugal to a civil war against RENAMO.  The war was continuing  
 
when President Reagan was inaugurated in 1981. Both the FRELIMO ruling party and  
 
the RENAMO parties were to become major players in courting public and bureaucratic  
 
opinion for their respective causes. This would help establish their legitimacy under  
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international law. 
 
2.3.2.1 FRELIMO 
 
            FRELIMO was founded in 1962 in Tanzania at a conference sponsored by  
 
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. FRELIMO was formed by combining three  
 
previously independent organizations. This was during the height of the African  
 
Nationalism and self-determination (decolonization) movement.  FRELIMO was formed  
 
from three separate organizations and gained the recognition of the Organization of  
 
African Unity (OAU) as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican People (Nelson,  
 
1993, 49). The first FRELIMO President was Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated  
 
in 1969. After a while the FRELIMO Central Committee eventually elected Samora  
 
Machel President in 1970.  FRELIMO became the governing body upon independence  
 
from Portugal in 1975. Due to FRELIMO’s Communist/Socialist leanings, the USSR and  
 
Cuba recognized them as the legitimate governing body and began nationalizing the  
 
country’s economic systems. FRELIMO was also considered a vanguard party by the  
 
USSR, in that it subscribed to the USSR’s Communist Party ideas and objectives.  
 
According to Cain (1985, 40) Mozambican President Samora Machel intended to make  
 
Mozambique “the first fully Marxist State in Africa.” In addition, according to Cain  
 
(1984, 40) Machel declared: “Our struggle is to destroy all vestiges of feudalism and  
 
colonialism, but fundamentally to crush capitalism, which is the most advanced form of  
 
exploitation of man by man.”  FRELIMO’s strategic objective was to keep control of the  
 
Mozambican Government and defeat the RENAMO insurgency. Under President  
 
Machel, the FRELIMO Government a signed Treaty of Friendship and Assistance with  
 
the USSR in 1976. The South African Government viewed the FRELIMO administration  
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as “politically inept.” (Hamann, 2001, 104)  In addition to the civil war in Mozambique,  
 
there were FRELIMO fighters in Angola during Operation Savannah which were  
 
discovered by the South Africans (Steenkemp, 2006, 73). Cuba and East Germany  
 
provided training for the Mozambican security forces (the Police and Armed Forces) the  
 
biggest problem with the Mozambican Armed Forces was that there were not enough  
 
government soldiers to combat the insurgency. Military analysts estimated that the  
 
Mozambique Armed Forces would need 85,000 soldiers to suppress RENAMO (Nelson,  
 
eds, 1984, 244). The total armed forces never numbered more than 26,000 (Nelson, eds,  
 
1984, 244) FRELIMO was governing Mozambique and Samora Machel was the  
 
Mozambican President in 1981 when President Reagan was inaugurated.  
 
2.3.2.2 RENAMO  
 
                 RENAMO was founded by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization  
 
(CIO) in 1976 and consisted of former FRELIMO officers. This association with  
 
Rhodesia formed the basis of the question on RENAMO’s legitimacy as an insurgency.  
 
The questions was would any sovereign states recognize RENAMO based on being allied  
 
with Rhodesia? RENAMOs original purpose was to keep Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO  
 
governed Mozambique from interfering in the Rhodesian civil war. This was done by  
 
keeping the Zimbabwean insurgents tied up, preventing them from launching attacks into  
 
Rhodesia and disrupting the Zimbabwean insurgency sanctuaries in Mozambique.  
 
   Until 1979 RENAMO had sanctuaries in Rhodesia and after 1979, the sanctuaries  
 
were relocated into South Africa because Zimbabwe became independent and the ruling  
 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Party would not allow RENAMO to  
 
operate. The group carried out the guerrilla warfare and insurgency since 1976 in  
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opposition to FRELIMO with backing from the Rhodesian government and after  
 
Rhodesia’s fall in 1979, the South African Government and former wealthy residents of  
 
Portugal, who had lived in Mozambique and lost property to FRELIMO (Nelson, eds,  
 
1984, 327) Some conservative movement in the US took an interest in RENAMO, due to  
 
their anti-communist philosophy. There was also a dispute as to how legitimate  
 
RENAMO was, as compared to the insurgency movements in Angola, like UNITA.  
 
RENAMO’s strategic objective was to either take control of the Mozambican  
 
Government or at least gain a power sharing agreement with FRELIMO.  According to  
 
Norval (1988, 190) RENAMO spent a lot of time and energy to win the hearts and minds  
 
of the Mozambican masses. The message was one of Mozambican nationalism instead of  
 
trading one colonial master-the Portuguese-for a far worse one-the Soviets; defending  
 
and respecting the traditions of the various Mozambican cultures and religions versus  
 
Marxist dictatorship; and freedom and the right of every Mozambican to earn his living  
 
as he saw fit, instead of the forced slavery of communism. 
 
   This would enhance RENAMO’s legitimacy as a political body. There has always been  
 
criticism of RENAMO as a political party. Some diplomats in the US State Department  
 
maintained it was not a legitimate political movement (Cohen, 2004, 181-183). This can  
 
be considered false. RENAMO did have a Manifesto, describing its objectives and  
 
political platforms. (Norval, 1988) 
 
2.4 Portugal   
 
 Portugal’s strategic objective until 1974 was to retain control of  
 
her African colonies, and after 1974, the strategic objective was to decolonize, but  
 
maintain diplomatic relations with the former colonies (Mokoena, ed, 1993, 18) 
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  In southern Africa, Portugal had colonized the areas of present day Angola  
 
and Mozambique in the 1400s and ruled them with an iron-fist until 1975. Successive 
 
Portuguese Governments exploited these colonies population and resources.  During the  
 
Portuguese rule, the colonies were not allowed to develop an indigenous bureaucracy or  
 
an efficient education system. This would provide for the multitude of problems that  
 
encased Angola and Mozambique after independence. Then the Portuguese for all  
 
purposes just abandoned both of these colonies after the 1974 coup in Portugal.   
 
The indigenous Angolan people started their guerrilla style war against Portugal  
 
in 1962. The indigenous Mozambicans had launched a guerrilla style war against the  
 
Portuguese starting in 1964. The main Mozambican guerrilla organizations combined and  
 
formed what was to become FRELIMO) which fought against the Portuguese  
 
Government and took over after independence.  Mozambican guerrilla movements could  
 
not militarily defeat the Portuguese Army in a conventional war, but they could  
 
effectively use guerrilla tactics to harass the army and make the Portuguese people in  
 
Lisbon and the colonies war weary.  
 
There was a problem that enraged the Africans, both in the  
 
colonies and in the independent African states and that was that Portugal was a  
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member and US arms to Portugal were used  
 
in the fight against the guerrillas. Portugal fought a costly war against the guerrillas until  
 
a coup overthrew the Marcelo Caetano government in April 1974. The economic and  
 
political costs of the drawn out conflicts in Africa were cited as a major factor for the  
 
coup against the government. The new Portuguese Government under General Spinola  
 
eventually agreed to independence for colonial Angola and Mozambique. Independence  
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was granted in June 1975 to Mozambique and in November 1975 to Angola.  Portugal  
 
eventually recognized the Marxist-Leninist governments in both states. 
 
 When President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, Portugal was still a  
 
member of NATO and economically and politically involved with her former colonies.  
 
2.5 South Africa  
 
             South Africa’s strategic objective was to be the hegemonic power in Southern  
 
Africa and to maintain the rigid doctrine of the apartheid state, which enforced  
 
segregation throughout virtually every facet of professional and personal life (Mokoena,  
 
1993, xix) South Africa was by far the dominant economic and military power in the  
 
region.  
 
Beginning in 1961, after the Sharpeville massacre, the official South African  
 
Government’s apartheid racial policies started angering the world. South African blacks  
 
began to demonstrate for changes to the apartheid laws. In 1960 anti-apartheid  
 
demonstrations resulted in the South African Police shooting and killing 69 black  
 
demonstrators in the town of Sharpeville.  The United Nations (UN) condemned the  
 
massacre and began the economic, military and political sanctions process, but since the  
 
west was dependent on South Africa’s mineral wealth for its industries, and consequently  
 
the sanctions were not vigorously enforced. In 1966, after Prime Minister Hendrix  
 
Verwoerd was assassinated, John Vorster became Prime Minister. Vorster faced up to the  
 
need to do business with South Africa’s black neighbors, by launching a policy of détente  
 
with alternate bullying and friendship (Sampson, 1987, 90) The strong South African  
 
economy propped up the ruling party’s apartheid regime and slowed the sanction’s  
 
effects  
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In 1976 the Soweto township riots broke out when the blacks began  
 
protesting the Bantu Education system and other inequalities under the apartheid system.  
 
The police opened fire on students, killing several people. The UN condemned these  
 
Actions (Mokoena, eds, 1993, 21). After Angola and Mozambique achieved  
 
independence, the South African government started work on a nuclear and chemical  
 
weapons program. (Mokoena, eds, 1993, 23, 27)  The UN also condemned this action.  
 
When the Cubans and Soviet Union began arming the radical groups such as the Angolan  
 
MPLA, Zaire and Zambia turned to the US and reportedly South Africa for assistance  
 
against the communist backed insurgencies. (Mokoena, 1993, 221, 224)  
 
Many of the southern African states, such as Zaire and Zambia feared the Soviet backed  
 
Marxist-Leninist governments. This could be thought of as an African “domino effect.”  
 
Once one country fell to Communism/Socialism, then the revolution would be exported  
 
to the neighboring countries. Eventually all the southern African states would be  
 
Communist controlled. The SAG would have to fight insurgencies on all fronts 
 
    After the U.S. Congress passed the Clark Amendment in 1975, which banned aid to the  
 
Angolan insurgents, the apartheid SAG feared a “total onslaught” by its majority ruled  
 
neighbors and Cuba/USSR. The SAG then began destabilization tactics against the Front- 
 
Line States (FLS) and also launched limited military incursions through SWA (later  
 
Namibia) into Angola in 1975.  SouthWest Africa was a South African administered  
 
mandate from the League of Nations, which was eventually declared illegal. This would  
 
become the centerpiece of Chester Crocker’s (1993) “Linkage” which will be discussed  
 
throughout this thesis.  The SAG in an effort to stave off majority rule in South Africa  
 
and Namibia backed UNITA in Angola. In an effort to hinder the Mozambican  
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FRELIMO government, the SAG backed RENAMO.  Moreover, South Africa viewed  
 
Angola and Mozambique as “buffer states” against guerrilla attacks and infiltration on  
 
their soil. When Portugal withdrew from Angola and Mozambique, the buffer zone  
 
strategy was finished and the RSA had a vested interest in keeping Mozambique  
 
destabilized.  As stated the RSA had also tried détente with the majority rule states with  
 
economic aid and trade concessions (Mokoena, eds, 1993, 274) This failed and the SAG  
 
sent troops into Angola several times between 1975 and 1981. 
 
   The SAG also had differences with the USG when the Carter Administration took over  
 
in 1977. The Carter Administration, emphasizing human rights, was putting pressure on  
 
the SAG to abolish apartheid and establish majority rule in the soonest time possible. In  
 
1978 Prime Minister Vorster was ousted after a scandal and was replaced by his Defense  
 
Minister Pieter W. (P.W.) Botha, who later became State President in a governmental  
 
reorganization. 
 
 When President Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, PW Botha was the South  
 
African State President and Pretoria was looking forward to better relations with the U.S.  
 
after a low point with President Carter.  Botha went on to describe this as a more  
 
realistic policy.  Commenting on this, General Jannie Geldenhuys (1994, 154) wrote that  
 
Ronald Reagan’s election as president signaled a new direction for South Africa.  
 
2.6 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)  
 
             The strategic objective of the USSR was to expand communist influence  
 
throughout the third world by promoting the spread of their socialist political and  
 
economic model. The third world socialist/communist parties adopting the Soviet model  
 
were called Vanguard Parties and were given preferential treatment by the USSR.  
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The USSR perceived a security threat against socialist parties in the third world, which  
 
led to a quest for allies who could help weaken or restrain the West (Kempton, 1989, 10)  
 
The Soviet Union would end up spreading more military aid than economic aid to the  
 
socialist countries, which would eventually become a source of problems. Also involved  
 
was the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stipulated that once a country was socialist, there was  
 
no backsliding out of the camp. The USSR actively enforced this doctrine with the  
 
invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and a possible invasion of  
 
Poland looming in 1980 when the independent Polish trade union Solidarity started vying  
 
for power against the Soviet backed Polish regime.   Since the end of World War II, the  
 
Soviet Union was the economic, military and diplomatic superpower rival to the U.S. The  
 
Soviet Union, under Nikita Khrushchev actively supported Anti-Colonial Wars of  
 
National Liberation throughout the third world.  
 
After Khrushchev was deposed in 1964, Leonid Brezhnev became Chairman of  
 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and continued support for Wars of National  
 
Liberation. The Wars of National Liberation focused on installing Soviet backed  
 
vanguard parties in the third world. Despite this active support for liberation movements,  
 
relations between the USSR and US engaged in dialogue to reduce the possibility of  
 
nuclear and non-nuclear warfare, especially in Europe. This was known as Détente.   
 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, especially during the Nixon and Ford Administrations,  
 
Détente between the U.S. and USSR was at its height. The U.S. and USSR signed the  
 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1972 in an attempt to control the arms race.  
 
More nuclear arms reduction and elimination (SALT II) talks were planned when  
 
President Carter took over in 1977.  There was debate in the US about the Soviet military  
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buildup and how massive it was. It was known that the Soviet Union had been a major  
 
arms supplier to Marxist-Leninist Regimes in Africa. But after the USG pulled out of  
 
Vietnam in 1975 the Soviet Union began an expansionist role throughout the third  
 
world including Africa. They supported the winning national liberation movement  
 
parties. In the 1970s, the USSR made great strides in the southern African region, with  
 
their surrogates winning Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. It was because of  
 
Soviet Union’s advances in Angola that President Ford declared the end of détente. The  
 
USSR also believed that the US was hamstrung by the specter of defeat in Vietnam and  
 
southeast Asia and would not act to protect their interest out of fear of becoming  
 
entangled in another third world conflict. The USSR backed the Cuban invasion and   
 
assistance to the MPLA in Angola in 1975. 
 
 When President Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, Leonid Brezhnev was  
 
Chairman of Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was actively  
 
fighting a war in Afghanistan to keep the USSR installed communist regime from  
 
falling. The USSR was also expanding its military, political, diplomatic and economic  
 
contacts in the southern African region. 
 
2.7 United States of America (USA) 
 
            The strategic objective of the US in southern Africa was to contain communist  
 
influence, promote racial justice/ majority rule prevent racial violence, spread democracy,  
 
and protect US access to southern Africa’s strategic minerals.  The United States also had  
 
extensive economic, military, scientific and political interests in the Republic of South  
 
Africa. The USG’s policy toward the RSA and southern Africa generally followed a  
 
pattern defined by the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. The USG could ill afford  
 
 44 
to have the RSA fall under Communist control. 
 
    The USG had also angered many newly decolonized majority ruled African states  
 
when President Richard Nixon called for a review of USG policy toward southern  
 
Africa.  National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (Rodman, 1994, 181) did the study  
 
and the infamous Option 2 came about:     “The premise was that the whites are here to  
 
stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is  
 
no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will  
 
only lead to chaos and increased opportunism for the communists. We can, by selective  
 
relaxation of our stance through the white regimes, encourage some modification of their  
 
current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to  
 
the black states (a total of $5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states)  
 
help to draw the groups together and exert influence on both for peaceful change. Our  
 
tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region and these can be maintained  
 
at an acceptable political cost.” (Mokoena, eds, 1993, 178)  In Cold War terms the  
 
southern African cape was vital in keeping commerce between the Atlantic and Indian  
 
Oceans open. The USG could ill afford to have the Soviet Union controlling the cape and  
 
the vital shipping routes. This would have a dramatic effect on commerce. According to  
 
Norval (1988, 17) Twenty percent of the American oil requirements passed via the Cape  
 
route within 20 miles of Cape Town. Norval (1988, 17) also mentioned that the West,  
 
especially the European NATO allies depended on the following goods that traveled the  
 
Cape sea route: 
• 60 percent of their total oil consumption 
• 70 percent of their strategic minerals 
• 25 percent of their food supplies. 
 
    The USG also consistently vetoed UN Resolutions condemning South Africa for  
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its actions in the region. Due to the Watergate scandal, Vietnam and President Nixon’s  
 
resignation, Gerald Ford became the first unelected US President in August 1974. It was  
 
at this time that USG policy toward Africa started to become more active. After the  
 
power sharing Alvor Accords agreement fell apart in Angola, the three political parties  
 
were engaged in a Civil War for control of the government. The parties were the MPLA,  
 
the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and UNITA.  The Ford Administration  
 
initially backed the FNLA, then the UNITA guerrilla movement in an effort to either  
 
keep the MPLA out of power or at least have them engage in a power sharing agreement.  
 
However due to the Watergate scandal and the specter of Vietnam, the US Congress did  
 
not want to get involved in any covert/overt operations.  The USC, in passing the Clark  
 
Amendment, cutoff all funding for Angola. While condemning the Soviet Union and  
 
Cuba for assisting the MPLA, the USC specifically mentioned military and para- 
 
military activities. This was one of the first times that the U.S. Congress specifically tied  
 
the hands of the President and the Executive Branch (Sarkesian and Vitas, 1988, 407- 
 
408) Ironically, while this was happening, the FREMILO Marxist-Leninist government in  
 
Mozambique was immediately recognized by the USG. During the 1976 Republican  
 
presidential primary, candidate Ronald Reagan ran against incumbent Republican  
 
President Gerald R. Ford on a promise to aid the anti-communist guerillas. Ronald  
 
Reagan was appealing to the conservative Republican base. 
 
    President James Carter came into office in 1977. He was a Democrat, who  
 
interjected human rights into the fray, particularly against apartheid South Africa.  
 
Relations with the USSR were a top priority, President Carter did not view the USSR  
 
as a communist threat.  This was his famous “there is an inordinate fear of communism”  
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speech. However the Carter Administration did not recognize the MPLA Angolan  
 
Government.  In December 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan and President Carter  
 
was forced to reassess the USG relations with the USSR. Due to the deteriorating  
 
economic situation in the US and the perceived weaknesses of the US military,  
 
candidate Ronald Reagan campaigned on a platform of building up America’s domestic  
 
and military might. President Ronald Reagan was elected to the US presidency,  
 
partly on a platform to confront the expansionist Soviet Union policies.  
 
2.8 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)  
 
           The strategic objective of Rhodesia’s white-minority Ian Smith Government was  
 
to maintain/preserve white control and dominance in the country. With regard to  
 
Portuguese ruled Mozambique, the strategic objective was to maintain a route to the  
 
Mozambican seaports on the Indian Ocean for economic reasons. (Norval, 1988, 187)  
 
Due to the Mozambican civil war, as well as international pressure and sanctions, the  
 
white ruled Rhodesian government eventually fell in 1979. The strategic objective of  
 
Zimbabwe, after Robert Mugabe became President was to consolidate majority rule with  
 
a Marxist-Leninist style government. 
 
   Rhodesia was part of the British Empire until the Unilateral Declaration of  
 
Independence (UDI)   in 1965. The racial policies of Rhodesia were similar to South  
 
Africa. After Prime Minister Ian Smith declared UDI, guerrilla wars broke out between  
 
the Rhodesian Government, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under  
 
Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) under Joshua  
 
Nkomo. The two fronts merged to become the Patriotic Front (PF). The UN then declared  
 
sanctions against the Rhodesian Government.   
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   In the U.S., politics interfered with the sanctions, setting a common theme for southern  
 
Africa, politics vs. reality.  Because of vital minerals, specifically Chromium, the USG  
 
did not enforce strict sanctions against Rhodesia. It was not until 1977, after President  
 
Carter took over, that the USG banned Rhodesian Chromium (Wilentz, 2008, 103). It is  
 
important to note that Rhodesia/Zimbabwe was dependent on Mozambique and South  
 
Africa for access to the sea for trade and communications. Due to South Africa’s  
 
hegemony, political considerations forced Zimbabwe to accept South Africa as a  
 
neighbor. 
 
    Until 1975, ZANU could not operate in neighboring Mozambique because the  
 
Caetano Portuguese government would not permit it and also supported white-ruled  
 
Rhodesia. After 1975 the Zimbabwe guerrillas could operate in Mozambique, using the  
 
country as a supply base and sanctuary against the Rhodesians. The political tide began to  
 
turn against the Ian Smith government. The Machel Government sealed Mozambique’s  
 
border with Rhodesia, cutting the Rhodesian’s economic routes to Mozambique’s ports.  
 
(Norval, 1988, 187)  In 1979 Rhodesia became majority ruled Zimbabwe under President  
 
Robert Mugabe. Just as President Reagan entered office; Zimbabwe concluded a defense  
 
and security agreement with Mozambique in January 1981 which covered “all the vital  
 
areas of defense and security” (Nelson, eds, 1984, 275) Zimbabwe was concerned with  
 
keeping FRELIMO in power, so that they could maintain access to the Mozambican port  
 
of Beira. The Port of Beira in Mozambique controlled the major railine which ended in  
 
Zimbabwe. With the port open, Zimbabwe was economically less dependent on South  
 
Africa. With the inauguration of the Reagan Administration, relations with Zimbabwe  
 
would start to cool down. 
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2.9 Summary   
 
    The incoming Reagan Administration had to deal with the chronic violence, political  
 
instability and civil war in southern Africa due to the battles between the South African  
 
apartheid white ruled government and African Nationalists fighting for majority  
 
rule/liberation when President Reagan took over on 20 January 1981. The Reagan  
 
Administration also had to deal with the destabilization of governments, both by South  
 
Africa against the FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA in Angola and the attempts by  
 
the Soviet Union to dominate South Africa by military and economic warfare. Other  
 
foreign governments were also actively involved in promoting their own national  
 
interests in the southern African region, especially the Communist Bloc which consisted  
 
of Cuba and the Soviet Union.  This was the bloc that President Reagan was to wage an  
 
offensive struggle against.  The Soviet Union was keen on expanding its influence in the  
 
region, especially with regard to Angola and Mozambique.  
 
The USG believed that the situation in Southern Africa was a result of the USSR  
 
and Cuba exporting their versions of Socialism/Communism in the former Portuguese  
 
Colonies of Angola and Mozambique. South Africa was actively working to destabilize  
 
MPLA ruled Angola to keep South West Africa (Namibia) under control and as a buffer  
 
against guerilla infiltration into South Africa. South Africa was also actively destabilizing  
 
FRELIMO ruled Mozambique to keep it’s eastern border secure and prevent the ANC  
 
infiltration. FRELIMO was a vanguard Marxist-Leninist USSR- backed government and  
 
this was cemented by the 20-year Treaty of Friendship with the USSR. The USSR also  
 
wanted to use Mozambique’s ports for its naval vessels and also airfields for aircraft use.  
 
This had the possibility of interfering with commercial and military shipping around the  
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African cape. The RENAMO guerrilla movement was formed as an alternative to the  
 
FRELIMO government. The center of debate then focused on the issue of legitimacy.  
 
Who was the authentic representative of the Mozambican people? Was it FRELIMO or  
 
RENAMO? More of this will be discussed later, as the issue had to do with aid, inter alia,  
 
to the southern African countries. 
 
President Reagan took over in 1981 proclaiming an unabashed support for  
 
anti-Communist revolution. Reagan intended to establish a new doctrine for such  
 
supporting Anti-Communist insurgents and governments by declaring equally worthy all  
 
armed resistance to communism, whether foreign or indigenously imposed.  In an effort  
 
to combat Soviet expansionism in the Southern African region, bureaucratic politics were  
 
to play a role in trying to stop the Soviet/Cuban expansion in the Southern Africa region.  
 
The Reagan Administration would go on the offensive to stop and roll back Communism.   
 
While the objectives were the same, the strategic ways and means were entirely different.  
 
The next chapter will be about the start of the Reagan Doctrine. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 The Reagan Doctrine and its Formulation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter details how the Reagan Doctrine came into existence as a result  
 
of the administration’s desire to contain and most significantly, attempted to reverse the  
 
spread of communism, especially in southern Africa. It is important to know that the  
 
Reagan Doctrine was a culmination of President Reagan’s and his Administration’s  
 
political thought and actions throughout his political life. Robert  
 
C. (“Bud”) McFarland, who succeeded Judge William Clark as the national  
 
security advisor in October 1983, recalls that there was no well-thought-out strategy or  
 
concept behind the new policy that began to be enunciated on his watch in early 1985 and  
 
that became known as the “Reagan Doctrine” (Rodman, 1994, 259) There was no  
 
specific book or manual of instruction on the Reagan Doctrine. As Peter Rodman, a  
 
staffer on the National Security Council writes: Reagan never gave McFarlane any  
 
instruction or uttered any word, that such a strategy should be developed. There was no  
 
National Security Study Directive (NSSD) asking for an interdepartmental review of the  
 
subject, nor any National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) in the president’s name  
 
setting forth a new policy-The procedures commonly followed for major initiatives. “Not  
 
one nano-second” went into any analysis or planning, McFarlane has scathingly  
 
recounted (Rodman, 1994, 259) While there was no specific “Reagan Doctrine,” NSSD  
 
or NSDD, there were other political decisions made through his presidency were  
 
expressed as National Security Decision Directives. Therefore, President Reagan’s  
 
National Security Decision Memorandums and Directives toward the southern African  
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region, particularly Mozambique, are analyzed for their content toward FRELIMO,  
 
RENAMO, the USSR and Cuba. President Reagan also made numerous speeches  
 
reflecting anti-communist/ Soviet sentiments, which can be taken as official policy,  
 
simply because the President decides and implements policy. Former CIA Director  
 
Robert Gates wrote that President Reagan first announced what amounted to the Reagan  
 
Doctrine in his May 9, 1982 speech at Eureka College, where “The President declared  
 
war on the Soviets in the Third World, pledging that the United States would support  
 
people fighting for freedom against communism, wherever they were.” (Gates, 1997,  
 
256)  
 
   The role of key officials in the US State Department and Defense Department  
 
bureaucratic actors in developing the Reagan Doctrine will be discussed, to determine  
 
how and why they came to their decisions, and the influence that they held over  
 
President Reagan.  
 
   Sometimes there were “pushbacks” against the Reagan Doctrine and these will  
 
be discussed here and in other chapters. Private lobbyists are an important factor in  
 
bureaucratic politics, because they represent “special interests.” The effects that non- 
 
governmental organizations (specifically think tanks and lobbyists) are examined.  
 
3.2 The Reagan Doctrine and the National Security Decision Directive Documents 
 
    As indicated earlier, there was no written policy or a so called trigger action or  
 
mechanism that would cause the Reagan Doctrine to be implemented (a so called trigger  
 
action or mechanism), what actually made up the Reagan Doctrine, or how to implement  
 
it (with or without Congressional assistance or other assistance, such as the CIA.) The  
 
origins of the Reagan Doctrine can be said to begin with Ronald Reagan’s desire to run  
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for the US Presidency in 1976 and in 1980.  In 1976 Reagan was defeated during the  
 
Presidential primary by incumbent President Gerald Ford, who went on to lose to  
 
President Jimmy Carter.  In 1980 Ronald Reagan secured the Republican Presidential  
 
nomination by running on a strong anti-communist platform and anti-Soviet Union  
 
platform. In its simplest form, the Reagan Doctrine was basically overt and covert  
 
support for anti-communist guerilla insurgencies and friendly governments. However  
 
there was no official or unofficial manual or document formally published that described  
 
the Reagan Doctrine.    The closest written documents that described the Reagan Doctrine  
 
could be considered the compilation of his National Security Study Directives (NSSDs)  
 
and his National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs).  
 
These directives need to be analyzed in depth because they describe how and why the  
 
doctrine developed and influenced by those closest to the president.  This would be the  
 
so-called “inner circle.” President Reagan also believed that the bureaucrats acting on  
 
their own or bureaucratic inaction also caused tyranny to flourish. In a speech he said: “It  
 
was C.S. Lewis who in his unforgettable Screwtape Letters: wrote: “The greatest evil is  
 
not done now in those sordid ‘dens of crime’ that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even  
 
done in concentration camps or labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is  
 
conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minted) in clean, carpeted,  
 
warmed, and well lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and  
 
smooth shaven cheeks who do not raise their voice.” (Diggins, 2007, 223) 
 
   There are several theories as to how the Reagan Doctrine was actually named.   
 
President Reagan talked about support for those fighting against Communism in 1982 in  
 
a speech to the British Parliament where he vowed support for “those fighting for  
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freedom against communism wherever we find them.” (Diggins, 2007, 223) The  
 
first mention of the term Reagan Doctrine was officially proclaimed by newspaper  
 
columnist Charles Krauthammer (Scott, 1996, 1).  President Reagan formally called for  
 
support for “Freedom Fighters” during his 1985 State of the Union speech, stating that  
 
“We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every  
 
continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet supported aggression and secure  
 
rights which have been ours from birth…Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.”   
 
Reagan also declared, “Time and again we’ve aided those around the world struggling for  
 
freedom, democracy, independence and liberation from tyranny…In the 19th century we  
 
supported Simon Bolivar, the great liberator. We supported the Polish patriots, the French  
 
resistance and others seeking freedom. It’s not the American tradition to turn away  
 
(Scott, 1996, 23). It was after this speech that the Reagan Doctrine was officially  
 
proclaimed by the media. 
 
    In addition to President Reagan, himself there were many of his advisors that  
 
contributed to the Reagan Doctrine theory and ideas. The most prominent would have  
 
been Harvard University Professor Dr. Richard Pipes, who worked on the National  
 
Security Council Staff during the Reagan Administration, if only for a short time.  
 
(Bailey, 1999, 13, Friedman, 2000, 453-454). Another was Fred Ikle, who served as an  
 
Assistant Secretary in the Defense Department. 
 
   According to US Ambassador to the UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick (A Democrat  
 
in President Reagan’s Republican Administration) and US Mission to the UN member  
 
Alan Gerson there were three requirements for the Reagan Doctrine to be considered: 
 
1. An indigenous, independent democratic insurgency (democratic resistance”) 
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2. A government relying on arms, personnel, and advisers from the Soviet Bloc to 
maintain it (“Soviet Client”)  
 
3. A population denied participation in their own government (“illegitimate 
government”) (Scott, 1999, 31) 
 
Based upon this criteria, it can be definitely stated that, with regards to Mozambique,   
 
the RENAMO anti-government movement met the criteria for assistance against the  
 
governing FRELIMO regime. 
 
3.3 The National Security Decision Directive Documents 
 
     The National Security Study Directive (NSSD) is the study of a situation and factors  
 
contributing to a specific problem, which needs to be resolved, the study results in  
 
proposed policy options to be brought to the president for a decision.  The National  
 
Security Decision Directives (NSDD) is a decision, which conveys the President’s chosen  
 
policy to the Executive Branch and to the nation for implementation and, if necessary  
 
Congressional or other further action. An NSSD is prepared when the President begins  
 
his administration or when a situation and/or a policy needs to be reviewed. As stated the  
 
NSSD is staffed at all levels, where bureaucratic interaction takes place.   Usually the  
 
National Security Council (NSC) prepares the NSSD and the National Security Advisor  
 
(NSA) presents the options/ recommendations to the President. The NSA is formally  
 
called the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA).  The  
 
President then makes the decision, signs the document and orders its implementation. The  
 
President’s NSA is usually a close advisor to the President and has influence and most  
 
importantly the President’s attention. The NSA position is not subject to the Senate  
 
confirmation process, so the President can choose his NSA without fear of failure. The  
 
NSAs to President Reagan were Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert McFarlane, Vice  
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Admiral John Poindexter, Frank Carlucci and General Colin Powell.  President Reagan  
 
had the most NSAs of any president since the position was established in 1947. This was  
 
to be a problem since there was no continuity. The NSAs were instrumental in preparing  
 
the documents that would implement the Reagan Doctrine. The NSC will be covered as  
 
part of the bureaucratic process.  Several of the most important Reagan Administration  
 
NSDDs will now be covered. The NSDD involve decisions regarding policy toward the  
 
Soviet Union and the southern African region and what the final end-state was to be. The  
 
NSDDs are the result of bureaucratic interactions and do not necessarily cover a single  
 
topic.  
 
3.3.1 NSDDs 32 and 75 
 
    Several of President Reagan’s NSSDs set the stage for implementing the Reagan  
 
Doctrine by aiding resistance movements, as well as implementing other actions against  
 
the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. NSSD 32 was the first Reagan Administration  
 
U.S. National Security Strategy toward the USSR. (Part of NSSD 32 remains  
 
classified today).  This outlined the US national and international strategic objectives.  
 
One of NSSD 32’s objectives was “To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet  
 
control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet  
 
support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.   
 
   The second NSSD was NSSD 75, which outlined “US Relations with the USSR.   
 
Parts of NSSD 75 remains classified today. This NSSD directed US strategy toward the  
 
USSR in the areas of diplomacy, propaganda, economics, subversion, military display,  
 
and war (Bailey, 1999, 14) The bureaucratic political strife was about to begin. Some  
 
inside the Reagan Administration were opposed to these measures (Bailey, 1999, 9) This  
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was because of restrictions put on US companies doing business with the USSR.   
 
   Of particular note, NSDD 75 paragraph 3(d) reads: “U.S. policy will seek to limit the  
 
destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World Allies and clients. It is a further objective to  
 
weaken and where possible, undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet  
 
Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and  
 
forces to bring about political change inside these countries. This paragraph was  
 
originally classified SECRET.  This was the source for aiding anti-communist insurgents  
 
such as UNITA and RENAMO, which would start the bureaucratic wars in Washington.  
 
Subsequently bureaucratic politics started to paralyze American Foreign Policy toward  
 
Mozambique (Ofcansky, 1988, 118)   
 
3.3.2 NSDD 166 
 
    NSDD 166 can be considered the first document that implemented the Reagan  
 
Doctrine (Coll, 2004, 127) Entitled “Expanded U.S. Aid to the Afghan Guerillas,” it was  
 
published in March 1985. It is worth looking at this document because this would be the  
 
model for assistance to anti-Soviet movements. This document was produced by Fred  
 
Ikle and Michael Pillsbury. Fred Ikle was an Assistant Secretary in the Defense  
 
Department and an ardent anti-communist hardliner (Coll, 2004, 126) Fred Ikle was  
 
willing to push the Reagan Doctrine to the limits against the Soviet Union. During an  
 
Interagency meeting in the spring of 1985, when someone asked him: What if the  
 
Russians begin shooting down the U.S. planes and ignite World War III, Ikle answered,  
 
according to Thomas Tweeten, a senior officer in the CIA’s clandestine service. “World  
 
War III. That’s not such a bad idea.” If he said such a thing, Ikle said later, he must have  
 
been kidding. But Tweeten remembered “a roomful of dumbstruck people.” (Coll, 2004,  
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128) With Ikle’s support, Pillsbury pushed a draft of NSDD-166 for Reagan’s signature.  
 
To help Afghan rebels overcome rising Soviet military pressures, he wanted to provide  
 
them with the best guerilla weapons and satellite intelligence. To do this Pillsbury needed  
 
new legal authority for CIA covert action that went beyond the Carter-era policy goal of  
 
“harassing” Soviet occupation forces. He sought to expand dramatically the stated aims  
 
and military means of the CIA’s Afghan jihad. (Coll, 2004, 127) President Reagan signed  
 
the classified NSDD-166 document in March 1985, formally anointing its confrontational  
 
language as covert U.S. policy in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, 127) The confrontational  
 
policy was the most far reaching and controversial position to the bureaucrats. 
 
3.3.3 NSDD 187, 212 and 272 
 
   The NSDD 187 was written in 1985 and while it primarily reflected US policy toward  
 
South Africa, there was mention of the southern African region.  Both NSDD 212,   
 
(written in 1986) and NSDD 272 (written in 1987) reflect an updated policy toward the  
 
southern African region.  These NSDDs were written especially to bring about change in  
 
South Africa and southern Africa, especially due to the US public pressure with regards  
 
to apartheid South Africa. These three (3) NSDDs reflect the State Department’s view  
 
that regional security could not be obtained while South Africa was the regional power  
 
and there was instability in the region. While the insurgents in southern Africa were anti- 
 
South African Government (SAG) in South Africa, in Angola and Mozambique the  
 
insurgents were anti-communist, anti-government forces.  It is important to note that all  
 
three NSDDs called for negotiations, as part of the approach to peace in the region.  This  
 
is an important part of the Reagan Doctrine.  All insurgencies could NOT be won  
 
militarily, therefore negotiations with the Governing party in power were essential. This  
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applied both to the anti-communist SAG and the communist Governments of Angola and  
 
Mozambique.  These documents reflect both a combination of Defense Department and  
 
State Department input (both pro and anti Reagan Doctrine implementation) The  
 
important event to realize is that all documents recognize negotiation as the way to peace  
 
and power sharing. The timing of the NSDDs were also important. NSDD 187 was  
 
published September 7, 1985 and NSDD 212 was published February 10, 1986, before  
 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA-1986).  NSDD 272 was  
 
published on May 7, 1987 after the CAAA of 1986, when the pressure was on South  
 
Africa to abandon apartheid.  NSDD 212 specifically states “While the fundamental  
 
objectives set forth in those objectives remain valid, U.S policies should accommodate  
 
new realities in southern Africa and the United States”. Paragraph 1.1 reads Avoidance  
 
and prevention of a scenario in South Africa of revolutionary violence and expanded  
 
Soviet influence through exploitation of internal and regional conflict.  Paragraph 2. reads  
 
Reduction and elimination (to the greatest possible extent) of Soviet and Cuban military  
 
presence, access, and influence in Angola and elsewhere in the southern African region.  
 
The post CAAA 1986 period clearly reflected the desire for reaching objectives of  
 
removal of Soviet influence and negotiations between all parties involved for power  
 
sharing. While the CAAA of 1986 involved South Africa, any actions involving South  
 
Africa involved the surrounding states due to South Africa’s hegemony. The only way  
 
toward successful negotiations was to have all parties involved. The Defense Department  
 
under Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger opposed military action (the use of US  
 
troops) to assist the insurgencies, but never the less favored limited military aid to the  
 
Mozambique Government (Ofcansky, 1988, 118).  
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   The State Department was opposed to aiding resistance movements and instead focused  
 
on weaning the governments away from communism.  While Shultz favored covert  
 
action, he believed the administration should have had a diplomatic or negotiating track  
 
as well in order to succeed in Central America, and also to build congressional and public  
 
support. (Gates, 1997, 295) The aid to RENAMO in particular was to become particularly  
 
contentious. 
 
3.4 President Reagan’s Objective Toward Mozambique 
 
As with all policy decisions, there must be objectives, otherwise there is no point  
 
in trying to devise, develop and implement a policy, it will just get bogged down. Staying  
 
on course toward the meeting objectives would help gain the overall desired end state of  
 
a multiparty state(s) and peace in the southern African region. 
 
The Administrations Objective’s [Toward Mozambique] were: 
 
1. Replace Soviet influence with the U.S. 
 
2. Reduce regional conflict vis-à-vis South Africa, 
 
3. Induce Machel’s FRELIMO Government into substantive negotiations with the 
very active RENAMO insurgents  (Mokoena, ed.1993, 278) 
 
3.5  President Reagan’s First Mention of Mozambique      
 
   President Reagan’s first reference to Mozambique was on 15 December 1982, when he   
 
met with the Portuguese leadership.  In his diaries, President Reagan writes on  
 
Wednesday, 15 December (1982): “A visit from Prime Minister Francisco Pinto  
 
Balsemao of Portugal, who expressed doubt that Angola and Mozambique would  
 
continue to maintain relationships with the USSR.” (Reagan, 2007,  
 
119) From this, one can deduce that in accordance with President Reagan’s  
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determination to bring an end to Soviet expansionism in southern Africa, that aiding OR  
 
at least the threat of aiding the RENAMO insurgents would entice the Mozambique  
 
Government to negotiate a political settlement.  This was reinforced almost one year later  
 
when President Reagan again met with the Portuguese leadership. Writing in his diaries,  
 
President Reagan mentioned in his diaries that on Thursday, September 15 (1983):  
 
“meeting with Pres. Antonio dos Santos Eanes of Portugal, who maintained that former  
 
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola were ready to move away from Soviet  
 
influence.” (Reagan, 2007, 179)  
 
3.6 Summary 
 
   The Reagan Doctrine was not developed during President Reagan’s term in office.  
 
Rather, it was a culmination of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet beliefs and  
 
actions throughout President Reagan’s political life. The Reagan Doctrine was not a  
 
single unified document, or a single decision that occurred at a particular time, that  
 
planned for the overthrow of the Soviet Union or Communism. Instead, it was a  
 
compilation of policies designed to reverse (rollback) the expansion of Soviet  
 
Communism, and stop the spreading of communism into independent sovereign states  
 
like Mozambique.  
 
   The Reagan Doctrine was developed, written, and executed by bureaucrats in both  
 
governmental and non-governmental bodies. The individuals had similar political beliefs  
 
and attitudes towards the Soviet Union that mirrored President Reagan’s.  These  
 
governmental bodies primarily were the NSC and the policy making bodies of the  
 
Executive Branch Departments.  The documents executing President Reagan’s policies  
 
were called National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) These NSDDs reflected the  
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hashed out process and political philosophies. The Executive Branch also executed the  
 
policies involved in implementing the Reagan Doctrine. The Departments to execute the  
 
Reagan Doctrine were primarily the Defense and State Department. The Reagan Doctrine  
 
was not a smooth policy, it was opposed by the bureaucrats in the State Department as an  
 
intrusion upon diplomacy.  
 
   The non-governmental organizations that heavily influenced execution of the Reagan  
 
Doctrine and lobbied toward application in Mozambique were mostly conservative  
 
oriented, the likes of the Heritage Foundation and others.  The Heritage Foundation was  
 
probably the most important, because of the influence it had over the governmental  
 
organs. More on these groups and their influence toward a Mozambique policy will be  
 
covered later. 
 
  There were many liberal special interest groups that were opposed to  
 
the Reagan Doctrine, or more specifically to where the aid was to be provided. The  
 
liberal group Trans Africa, for example, was opposed to President Reagan aiding the  
 
UNITA insurgency, but was not totally opposed toward President Reagan’s policy toward  
 
Mozambique. The policy of diplomacy was paramount. The Trans Africa Director  
 
Randall Robinson even supported Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker (Baker,  
 
1989, 56-58)  
 
   Chapter Four covers the bureaucrats in Congress and the Non-Governmental  
 
Agencies and how they either supported or opposed the Reagan Doctrine and the  
 
implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
 
Chapter 4  
 
The Congressional and Non-Governmental Response to the Reagan Doctrine 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
     This chapter will focus on how the US Congress and non-governmental  
 
agencies dealt with the Reagan Doctrine and the decision-making process pertaining to  
 
the US’ policy toward Mozambique in particular.  It is important to remember that it is  
 
hard to separate the application of the Reagan Doctrine to Mozambique from its  
 
application to other countries and the overall objective of containing and rolling back  
 
Soviet expansion in the Third World. Southern Africa, was at least, partly of  
 
interest to the US Congress because of several factors, including: a) the duties of the  
 
Congress as specified in the US Constitution, especially dealing with the power of the  
 
purse (monetary duties), b) the concerns of congressional constituents, especially among  
 
key voting blocs, such as conservatives, black (African-American), and liberals, and c)  
 
the CBC. Most of the interest in the region was due to South  
 
Africa’s apartheid policies and that spilled over to the region. Another concern was, the  
 
Soviet/ Eastern Bloc’s presence in southern Africa. The Congress split  
 
over the Reagan Doctrine by which country to apply the doctrine to, the role of South  
 
Africa as the regional power and the role of the United States in general. The US  
 
Congress did not vote any military / armament assistance to RENAMO, like they did in  
 
the case of UNITA. The US Congress was suspicious of covert operations after Vietnam,  
 
as shown by the votes to cut-off aid to the anti-Nicaraguan Government rebels, the  
 
Contras. In 1985 Congress repealed the Clark Amendment, which allowed arms transfers  
 
to UNITA.  In UNITA’s case, they voted to supply equipment such as, for example,  
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Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Policies in Congress were decided upon by such matters as  
 
the particular piece of legislation and the political party controlling Congress.  
 
      This chapter also deals with the application of the Reagan Doctrine toward  
 
Mozambique and the role of non-governmental agencies, especially “special-interest  
 
groups.”  As mentioned in Chapter 3, special interest groups were regarded as more  
 
responsible than any other group when it came to garner support for the Reagan  
 
Doctrine being applied to Mozambique. The influence of such groups was astounding.  
 
This has been illustrated, for example, by the Heritage Foundation, and the Free the  
 
Eagle Foundation, which could mount a formidable lobbying campaign that could  
 
influence the President of the United States (POTUS).  As former Assistant  
 
Secretary of State Herman Cohen (2000, 183) observed: “Political conservatives  
 
maintained pro-RENAMO pressure fairly steadily during the last two years of the Reagan  
 
Administration, but not enough to force the issue to resolution at high levels. One of the  
 
rare briefings I was asked to give President Reagan on an African subject concerned  
 
RENAMO (apart from Routine briefings, he received an hour-long briefing prior to visits  
 
by African heads of state.”  This is consistent with other sources on  
 
the Reagan Doctrine toward Mozambique, but according to President Reagan’s diaries,  
 
he (Reagan) encouraged FRELIMO to negotiate with RENAMO (Reagan, 2007, 536). 
 
4. 2 Congress and Southern Africa 
 
   Contrary to what is heard about lack of concern about Africa, the US Congress was  
 
concerned about southern Africa, but as with the US Senate most of the attention focused  
 
on the apartheid policies of the RSA, and the presence of Cuban troops and Soviet  
 
Advisors in Angola.  Within the sphere of South Africa, the US civil rights  
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demonstrations against apartheid were probably the largest since the civil rights  
 
marches that brought the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Acts, which ended  
 
segregation in the US. Enacted in 1976, the Clark Amendment prohibited aid to guerilla  
 
movements, most notably UNITA, in Angola. During this time Mozambique was almost  
 
of secondary importance to the US.   
 
   The State Department engaged in politics against the Congress, when Chester Crocker  
 
criticized Congress over the Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act of 1986. Chester  
 
Crocker (1992, 268) writes: “that the HOR represents their (US) constituents and not  
 
foreigners 8,000 miles away.” The criticism that Assistant Secretary of State Crocker  
 
brought against the U.S. Congress was important, because even though it involved  
 
sanctions against South Africa, it impacted southern African policy. The basic premise  
 
was that South Africa’s security was threatened by the Cuban and Soviet military  
 
presence, particularly in Angola. Without South Africa feeling secure from the  
 
communist threat, there would be no peace in the southern African region.  This was  
 
particularly important toward Mozambique, because of RENAMO and one of the major  
 
South African liberation movements, the ANC bases in Mozambique. As mentioned  
 
earlier, it can also be argued that the US Congress also supported RENAMO by cutting  
 
the military and non-military aid to the government of Mozambique. But, as President  
 
Reagan urged Mozambique President Chissano to negotiate with RENAMO, and as  
 
FRELIMO was coming out of the Soviet orbit, Mozambique became the largest recipient  
 
of US aid in the southern African region. (Baker, 1989, 58) 
   
     In regards to covert action, most of the attention focused on Angola, because this was  
 
the biggest conflict in southern Africa. While this study focuses on Mozambique, the  
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decisions made toward southern Africa by the US Congress cannot be taken in a  
 
vacuum, because the idea of the Reagan Doctrine was to extract a toll on the Soviet  
 
Union by supporting the anti-communist so-called “freedom fighters.” The Soviets were  
 
most active in Angola, and eventually the U.S. Congress set politics aside and repealed  
 
the Clark Amendment on August 8, 1985. On November 12, 1985, just a week before his  
 
first summit meeting with USSR President Gorbachev, Reagan signed a presidential  
 
finding authorizing covert lethal assistance to UNITA. The CIA formed a special task  
 
force to administer the program, and weapons and other military equipment were soon  
 
flowing to Savimbi-though at a fraction of the level of Soviet assistance to the MPLA.  
 
(Gates, 1997, 347).Another possible scenario is that the US Government covertly sent aid  
 
to RENAMO through third parties for plausible deniability. 
 
4.3 The Duties of the Congress 
 
    As governed by the US Constitution, the US Congress is the government’s legislative  
 
branch, constituted with (enacting) making the laws of the US. Perhaps, most  
 
importantly within the bureaucracy, the Congress also controls the “power of the purse,” 
 
which determines how public (taxpayers) money will be allocated to the USG agencies  
 
and for what programs and activities.  This is perhaps the most important part of any  
 
bureaucratic power- the power to control spending and budgeting, who pays and who  
 
gets what. Without funding resources, it is almost impossible to get the tools to  
 
accomplish the necessary missions to execute and implement the policy. The Congress  
 
also provides oversight on spending and policies. If the Congress is of the  
 
opposite party as the President, then the oversight is tougher.  The US Congress is  
 
composed of the House of Representatives, elected on proportional representation from  
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the states, and the US Senate, which comprises two senators from each state.  
 
4.4 The US Senate 
  
   The US Senate is the upper body of the legislature and is charged with legislating laws  
 
in conjunction with the House of Representatives.  The US Senate body that deals  
 
with foreign affairs is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During the Reagan  
 
Administration, this body was chaired by the arch-conservative Jesse Helms (Republican) 
 
from North Carolina. There will be more on his support for RENAMO, in this chapter  
 
Additionally the Senate has the responsibility to confirms all presidential appointments,  
 
including the Cabinet officers and ambassadors and ratifies the international treaties,  
 
which the US will become a party to. With respect to policy, the decision to implement  
 
and what forms of the Reagan Doctrine would be then influenced by whom President  
 
Reagan appointed to positions inside the various departments, including the Departments  
 
of Defense and State and other executive branch agencies. The US Congress would then  
 
have to confirm (by simple majority) the governmental officials involved in the decision- 
 
making process, including the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director  
 
of the CIA. Since the Senate was a majority of the Republican Party, the confirmation  
 
process was easier, but never the less President Reagan had problems with some  
 
appointees because they were not considered sufficiently ideological  
 
(Crocker, 1992, 88-91).   
 
   Conservative senators such as, for example, Senator Jesse Helms were instrumental in  
 
shaping the Reagan Doctrine with regards to southern Africa and Mozambique by  
 
holding up or denying nominations of suspected “non-ideologues”-i.e. persons who did  
 
not sufficiently espouse anti-communism. At the beginning of the Reagan  
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Administration, Senator Helms even held up the nomination of Assistant  
 
Secretary of State for African Affairs- Chester Crocker on the account of Crocker  
 
perceived as not being a true Reagan conservative, but rather a regional specialist who  
 
would be overly sympathetic toward black Africa (Baker, 1999, 8, Crocker, 1992, 88, 91)  
 
 Senator Helms directly also influenced President Reagan’s nomination for the U.S.  
 
Ambassador to Mozambique. In support of RENAMO, he “held” the nomination of US  
 
Ambassador to Mozambique, Melissa Wells, ending in the fall of 1987, until Helms was  
 
satisfied that progress was being made in Mozambique (Crocker, 1992, 260), and Senator  
 
Jesse Helms was from the same party as President Reagan!  
  
    The Senate also failed to give non-lethal military aid to the Mozambique Government  
 
(Crocker, 1992, 249). This can be considered part of the Congressional support for  
 
RENAMO, because they were denying support to the sovereign, legitimate, Mozambique  
 
Government. Despite these individual examples of Congressional support for RENAMO,  
 
they mostly dealt with the southern African issues and particularly South Africa with  
 
regards to economic sanctions and other forms of legislation to combat Apartheid. This  
 
will be covered later. 
 
4.5 The US House of Representatives (HOR) 
 
   The members of the US HOR, elected every two years, are elected from each state  
 
proportional to the state’s population.  The HOR is considered the lower body and is  
 
important because all appropriations must originate from the HOR, as specified in the US 
 
Constitution. There was dissention within the HOR about the Reagan Doctrine toward  
 
southern Africa, particularly toward Angola and the RSA’s  
 
involvement with anti-Communist resistance movements. With the HOR representing  
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individual districts, it is their constituents’ views that they must represent or be voted out  
 
of office. The most influential Republican was Representative Dan Burton (Republican,  
 
Indiana)  On the Democratic side there was considerable perception that the Democratic  
 
Party was “soft” on Communism. To fight this perception Representative Stephen Solarz  
 
(Democrat-New York) (in Rodman, 1994, 269 maintained that: “Despite our long and  
 
honorable tradition of anti-Communism, Democrats have tended in recent years to refrain  
 
from forthrightly expressing our view of the inherent immorality of the Soviet  
 
system… But a resolute anti-Communist policy for the Democrats requires more than  
 
simply denouncing Communist tyranny. It means, for a start, being just as vigorous in  
 
advocating legitimate defense spending as we are in denouncing Pentagon waste…It  
 
means resisting Communist expansion in the third world by providing arms and aid to  
 
non-Communist forces, such as those in Afghanistan and Cambodia, resisting Communist  
 
invasion and occupation of their countries”  
   
4.6 The Congressional Constituents 
  
  Since the congressional residents elect their congressperson, members of  
 
Congress must be responsive (or at least appear to be responsive) toward them.  The  
 
ethnic and political composition of Congress also plays an important factor.  This  
 
involved the pitting liberal northern states against the conservative southern states,  
 
Democrats against Republicans, liberal urban cities against conservative’s rural areas.  
 
Sometimes political parties were pitted against each other, such as conservative  
 
democrats against liberal democrats. The college student campus protests against private  
 
and local government investment in South Africa also played to Congress. As a result it  
 
was hard to mold a congressional policy toward southern Africa, except for the proposed  
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economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa.  Many individual states and  
 
cities favored the economic sanctions against South Africa and would advocate  
 
divestment and disinvestment from US businesses that had offices in South Africa  
 
(Massie, 1997, 523-557).       
 
     While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to cover South African sanctions, the  
 
economic, political, and military security for South Africa was a key point of the  
 
Reagan strategy. The more secure South Africa was, or at least felt, the less South  
 
Africa had to worry about its Communist neighbors and the spread of communism.   
 
When Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accords in 1984 for security purposes, this also  
 
gave security to South .Africa’s eastern flank by stopping the infiltration of the ANC  
 
agents into South Africa. 
 
4.7 The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC)  
 
    The CBC includes African-American congresspersons that represent the interest of the  
 
African-American constituency in the US and also to promote better relations with  
 
African majority ruled countries. The CBC can also be considered almost a special  
 
interest group, except it is made up of public (Congresspersons), instead of private  
 
persons. By the mid 1970s and 1980s, members of the of the CBC were predominantly  
 
 
 
liberals from the urban areas, such as, for example, New York City, Chicago, Detroit,  
 
Cleveland, and Los Angeles and Philadelphia. The CBC’s African political agenda was  
 
very different from President Reagan’s resulting in a clash between President Reagan, the  
 
Executive Branch, and even cause deep divisions between the US Congress members,  
 
because of the actions of the CBC toward Africa (Crocker, 1992, 253-255).   
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   The CBC was totally against aid to RENAMO and UNITA, and also wanted total  
 
sanctions against South Africa and the termination of diplomatic relations with South  
 
Africa. The CBC’s support for the cutoff of aid to RENAMO and UNITA was based  
 
upon the fact that the South African Government aided and supported these insurgencies  
 
against the majority rule governments. The CBC supported Trans Africa when there were  
 
demonstrations and arrests at the South African Embassy in Washington D.C.  Protests  
 
by the CBC hampered President Reagan’s strategy toward southern Africa by tying his  
 
hands with the enactment of sanctions and the opposition of aid to RENAMO and  
 
UNITA. The worst part of this, is that this was strictly based upon racial politics and the  
 
fact that South Africa was supporting these two resistance movements.  The CBC was  
 
concerned about the fact that the US was either backing or seemed to be backing the  
 
racist SAG.   
 
 4.8 The Non-Governmental Organizations and The Reagan Doctrine 
 
    Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were primarily divided into liberal and  
 
conservative organizations. The power of an NGO or a special interest organization lies  
 
in the fact that it can mobilize members and the public to oppose or support a policy or  
 
legislation. The more members calling the congress, the more likely a vote will be  
 
swayed. Moreover, NGOs also have the power to influence the bureaucracy. NGOs,  
 
specifically think-tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation made the largest contribution to  
 
 support of RENAMO. This support included material, monetary, as well as  
 
moral and political backing.  Probably the most influential conservative NGO/special  
 
interest group, the Heritage Foundation, was well connected to the US  
 
Congress and its members such as Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina) The  
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Heritage Foundation was strongly anti-Communist and saw the southern African struggle  
 
in terms of East versus West.  At the end of 1986, two powerful conservative lobby  
 
groups, Free the Eagle and Conservative Action Foundation, helped RENAMO set up  
 
two offices in Washington, D.C., to disseminate information about the war in  
 
Mozambique.  These organizations had a significant influence in the move to provide aid  
 
to RENAMO.  The organization has the ability to influence governmental bodies beyond  
 
normal means. (Ofcansky, 1988, 118) 
 
    The most liberal special interest group was TransAfrica headed by Randall Robinson,  
 
which favored the governments such as the MPLA and FRELIMO governments over the  
 
UNITA and RENAMO. This was due to apartheid South Africa’s support for the anti- 
 
communist resistance movements. It did not matter whether the movements were  
 
indigenous or not. The politics of apartheid took precedence. As long as these movements  
 
were aided or backed by apartheid South Africa, then TransAfrica opposed them.  
 
TransAfrica was mostly responsible for organizing the political initiative to lobby for  
 
congressional support to pass the CAAA-1986. TransAfrica was also not in favor of  
 
the Reagan Doctrine.    
 
   The White House supported by the State Department hoped to “wean away”  
 
Mozambique from the Soviet Union by arranging a meeting between President’s Machel  
 
and Reagan, which occurred on 18 September 1985.  In response many American  
 
Conservatives spoke out against what they perceived to be “a highly questionable policy  
 
(Ofcansky, 1988, 118). The State Department further opposed the Reagan Doctrine as  
 
applied to RENAMO. As far as aid for the RENAMO was is concerned, US Assistant  
 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost told a group of reporters in  
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Maputo on 18 December 1986 that the American Government did not support RENAMO  
 
(Ofcansky, 1988, 118). 
 
   Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen (2000, 284)   
 
further writes about special interest influence: ‘The president said he received many  
 
letters from his friends in Orange County, California, urging him to recognize  
 
RENAMO’s anti-communist credentials. He asked my opinion as to why he should not  
 
listen to his friends. I explained that RENAMO was totally dependent on South African  
 
military support and had gotten its start with the indispensable assistance of the white- 
 
minority Rhodesian regime, defunct since 1980. We lacked substantial evidence of a  
 
popular RENAMO base within Mozambique. In contrast to Angola, where the popular  
 
UNITA was led by his good friend Jonas Savimbi. The president’s reaction to my  
 
briefing was comforting in that he was unwilling to be rushed into applying his famous  
 
“doctrine” to a country, just because of a “Marxist” label. He was also telling me,  
 
however, that he needed breathing space, I believed, was to persuade President Chissano  
 
to accept negotiations aimed at transforming RENAMO from a guerrilla army into a  
 
political competitor.” 
 
    President Reagan did show support for this position when he urged Mozambican  
 
President’s Machel and Chissano to negotiate with FRELIMO. Never the less the simple  
 
threat of recognizing RENAMO eventually started the negotiations between FRELIMO  
 
and RENAMO. This showed the RENAMO was a viable political movement. 
 
4.9 Issues of Secrecy and Interest Groups 
 
  Special interest groups have to answer to their constituents and it does not matter if it  
 
interferes with policy. Since many special interest groups and influential individuals are  
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usually regular civilians and therefore are not eligible for access to classified  
 
governmental information, they do not have a full idea of what the government is trying  
 
to accomplish or has actually accomplished in many situations. Without access to  
 
information, interests groups may publish incorrect information. This was mentioned by  
 
President Ronald Reagan (2007, 595) wrote in his memoirs, “At 11: 30 another meeting  
 
with leaders of hard core Conservative Leaders Paul Weyrich, Gen. Graham etc. Half  
 
hour meeting became an hour. As usual they had us on the wrong side in Afghanistan  
 
settlement, Mozambique, Chile & Angola. It is amazing how certain they can be when  
 
they know so d—n little of what we are really doing.”  
 
  Secrecy was also part of the bureaucratic problems between agencies (inter-agency) and  
 
even within the same agency (intra-agency) This had the possibility of hampering  
 
decision-making as “the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing.”   
 
   Secrecy is also a vital part of covert operations. DCI Casey persuaded President Reagan  
 
to put an absolute premium on secrecy. On this Schweizer (1994, 19) maintained, “Not  
 
only would the NSPG alone discuss proposed operations but members of the group  
 
would not be given advanced notification that proposed covert operations were going to  
 
be discussed. Papers prepared by Casey’s aides would be passed out at the end of the  
 
meeting and discussed on the spot. Decisions would be made by the NSPG alone-without  
 
any support staff input. They did not want any leaks.” While leaks were not a big part of  
 
demonstrations against foreign policy, such as when the CIA Operations against the  
 
MPLA were exposed in 1975, they have to be considered. This is where the issue of  
 
sending aid to RENAMO covertly through third parties comes up for discussion. While  
 
there is no current evidence of the US Government giving covert lethal aid to RENAMO,  
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either directly or indirectly, this scenario cannot definitely be ruled out. With the direct  
 
evidence of the US Government illegally aiding the anti-Sandinista Contras, there is just  
 
too much circumstantial evidence to ignore this. 
 
4.10 Interest Groups Protest Against President Samora Machel 
 
    In 1985, Mozambique President Samora came to the United States seeking US  
 
governmental aid for Mozambique. The visit provided a forum for RENAMO to present  
 
its case to President Ronald Reagan, the US Congress, the American people, and the  
 
world.  As Alex Vines (1991, 43) writes, “The major catalyst for the emergence of an  
 
active RENAMO presence in the US was, however the visit of President Machel to  
 
Washington D.C in 1985. Machel’s appearance as an official guest was distasteful to a  
 
right wing used to seeing Machel portrayed as a ruthless pro-Soviet, anti-American  
 
Marxist dictator.” This led to a campaign, mobilized and funded by an organization  
 
called the “Conservative Caucus,” to prevent Machel’s visit. Unable to stop it, the Caucus  
 
organized a series of anti-Machel meetings during his visit   All of this helped to mobilize  
 
support for RENAMO among Senators and Congressmen.’ (Vines, 1991, 43) Secretary  
 
Shultz (1993, 1111-1116) has admitted that he was afraid of the special interest group  
 
influence. Special interest groups took every anti-American word and every pro-Soviet  
 
word that President Machel ever said and took out newspaper ads against him. However,  
 
at the end of the meeting, President Reagan had a favorable view of Machel. After his  
 
visit with President Machel, President Reagan (2007, 354) commented in his diary, “A  
 
busy one-A State visitor – Pres. Machel of Mozambique. Turned out to be quite a guy & I  
 
believe he really intends to be “non-aligned” instead of a Soviet patsy. We got along  
 
fine.”   
 75 
 
4.11 The Gersony Report and Special Interest Groups 
 
   The Official State Department report on RENAMO, called the Gersony Report, for its  
 
author Robert Gersony pitted the (especially conservative) special interests groups  
 
against the State Department and even Reagan Administration officials against the State  
 
Department and each other.  Liberal special interest groups (especially those supporting  
 
human rights) were supportive of the report and used it to bolster their cause against  
 
supporting RENAMO. The most virulent part of the report mentioned that “100,000  
 
civilians may have been murdered” as a result of widespread violence and brutality by the  
 
rebel group. Victims were beaten, mutilated, starved, shot, stabbed or burned to death, the  
 
report said. (Pear, 1988, 1) There were even thoughts that the report was rigged to favor  
 
the State Department’s approach and that this has hampered the peace process (Cohen,  
 
2000, 182) The document infuriated conservative American lobbyists for RENAMO,  
 
who said it was politically motivated and intellectually dishonest. (Pear: 1) In Congress,  
 
Congressman Burton of Indiana denounced “liberal appeasers in the State Department”  
 
for their refusal to deal with RENAMO (Pear, 2000, 3) Eventually Assistant Secretary of  
 
State Cohen admitted that the report’s analysis was erroneous (Cohen, 2000, 183) This  
 
may have also caused a backlash amongst conservatives. But by the time that the report  
 
was released, the Reagan Administration was leaving office. This report hampered full  
 
aid to RENAMO. 
 
4.12 Non-Governmental/ Special Interest Aid to RENAMO 
     
    Non-Governmental aid to Mozambique was as simple as providing desks, office  
 
space and the use of telephones to the Mozambique Research Center to efforts to supply  
 
radios and medical supplies (Pear, 1988: 1) As with any endeavor, some interest groups  
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literally put their money where their mouth is. James Blanchard, a Louisiana  
 
businessman, for example, said that he started providing assistance to RENAMO in 1986  
 
by purchasing medical supplies and radios for the rebel group. He has contributed about  
 
$3,000 a month to advance the guerilla groups interests. He has also funded, the  
 
Washington operations of the Mozambique Research Center and provided cash payments  
 
to prominent Mozambican refugees sympathetic to RENAMO. Mr. Blanchard estimated  
 
that he had donated a total of $50,000 to $75,000 to RENAMO in the last two years.  
 
(Pear, 1988, 2) Freedom Inc., for example, donated $15,000 to the Mozambique Research  
 
Center in March of this year (1988) (Pear, 1988, 2) Freedom Inc. also admitted it they  
 
had entered Mozambique from Malawi in September 1986, bringing knives, walkie- 
 
talkies and other supplies to the rebels. The groups also met with Mr. Dhlakama, the rebel  
 
leader (Pear, 1988, 2) American private aid, while separate from the government can be  
 
considered a good gauge of support. Special interest groups played a very important part  
 
in the U.S. government toward RENAMO. As Minter writes: ‘…And despite  
 
RENAMO’s failure to win the same failure to win the same level of official approval,  
 
private networks with semi-official links significantly added to RENAMOs base of  
 
external support.’ (Minter, 1994, 156) While there is no evidence of private American  
 
groups providing lethal aid (weapons) to RENAMO, if any was provided this might be a  
 
violation of neutrality laws. 
 
    Liberal special interest groups like, for example, Trans Africa, headed by Randall  
 
Robinson were anti-RENAMO, simply because RENAMO was viewed as a tool of the  
 
racist South African apartheid regime (Baker, 1989, 56-59) Most of Tran Africa’s  
 
campaigns focused on political, economic, and military sanctions against South Africa  
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and the apartheid government.  The “one man-one vote” issue was also a prominent issue  
 
among TransAfrica members. 
 
4.13 Summary 
 
    There was substantial bureaucratic division among the US Congress about the events  
 
and developments in southern Africa. Most of it was due to President Reagan’s  
 
strategy toward the southern African region in the effort to prevent South Africa from  
 
becoming a communist state or another Vietnam style entanglement for the U.S. This  
 
went as far back as 1975 when the Clark Amendment was adopted to prevent aid from  
 
going to UNITA in Angola.  There was much division about applying the Reagan  
 
Doctrine toward Angola, and also applying it to Mozambique. There was also a concern  
 
about RENAMOs political legitimacy. Overall in the southern African region there was  
 
particular concern about sanctions against South African sanction problem and whether  
 
or not to institute economic sanctions against South Africa for it’s apartheid policies.  
 
   These congressional divisions started back in 1975/1976 when the Clark Amendment  
 
banning foreign military and paramilitary operations and aid to UNITA and Angola took  
 
effect. Politics played apart because many in Congress were afraid of another protracted  
 
conflict like Vietnam. While the conflict in Mozambique did not end until 1992, there  
 
was to be no introduction of U.S. troops. 
 
     The most influential Senators pertaining to the RENAMO issue were Jesse Helms and  
 
Robert Dole. Without Senator Helms making RENAMO a cause célèbre, Mozambique  
 
would probably not even have been on the radar. With his chairing the Senate Foreign  
 
Relations Committee, being a Republican, spokesman for conservative causes, the  
 
Reagan Administration could not afford to ignore him. His holding up President  
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Reagan’s nominations for the southern African regions representatives made him a  
 
powerful player. Senator Helms was also responsible for the decision to terminate  
 
aid to Mozambique. A case can be made that the termination of aid to Mozambique could  
 
be considered part of the Reagan Doctrine, because it undercut the Government of  
 
Mozambique.  The CBC was also instrumental in focusing attention on South Africa,  
 
especially with the sanctions issue. The CBC supported the Governments of Angola and  
 
Mozambique, while being against aiding the UNITA and RENAMO resistance  
 
movements.  However the CBC did not have the votes to stop the repeal of the Clark  
 
Amendment or termination of aid to the Government of Mozambique.   
 
While it can be argued that the U.S. Congress also supported RENAMO by cutting the  
 
military and non-military aid to the government of Mozambique, the U.S. Congress also  
 
never passed any formal type of aid on RENAMO. This shows the depth of divisiveness  
 
of the issue of aid to the Government of Mozambique and aid to the RENAMO resistance  
 
movement. Generally Republicans favored the aid to RENAMO, while Democrats  
 
favored aid to the Government of Mozambique. But this could put the Republican  
 
Congresspersons at odds with the Reagan State Department, who were basically opposed  
 
to RENAMO. Though there were problems with particular votes to support the anti- 
 
communist freedom fighters or rebels, the U.S. Congress was generally helpful in  
 
supporting the President. According to former CIA Director Gates: “It was, after all, the  
 
Democrats in Congress who provided Reagan the critical votes on defense spending and  
 
for covert actions in Afghanistan, Angola, and even in Central America (a fact that  
 
neither Democrats nor Republican like to acknowledge). (Gates, 1997, 558) In the final  
 
analysis, though, for all its obstructionism, criticism, and complicating actions, Congress  
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approved the weapons programs, covert actions, arms control agreements, and other  
 
measures requested by Presidents to pursue-and control-the struggle with the Soviets.  
 
(Gates, 1997, 559) 
 
  This chapter also showed the enormous influence of the non-governmental agencies and  
 
special interest groups. Both Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs Crocker  
 
and Cohen specifically mentioned the influence of the special interest groups toward anti- 
 
communist attitudes toward FRELIMO and toward Communist Mozambique. Even  
 
President Reagan mentioned their influence and lobbying him toward a favorable view of  
 
RENAMO.  Secretary Shultz mentions in his book about the influence of interest groups  
 
toward both helping RENAMO and working against President Machel during his official  
 
state visit with President Reagan.   
 
   Special interest groups were more responsible than any other group when it came to  
 
canvassing support for the Reagan Doctrine being applied to Mozambique.  In addition  
 
to lobbying for governmental aid and recognition toward RENAMO, non- 
 
governmental organizations and special interest groups gave money and some materiel  
 
aid, such as radios to them. This can be the greatest attribute to an organization-putting  
 
their money where their mouth is. If the organizations paid, they probably expected to get  
 
something in return. The bureaucratic downside is that this involved private individuals  
 
giving aid to a foreign movement, of which the aid might be contrary to the government  
 
policy. But unless there were weapons or some dangerous materiel involved, there was  
 
probably nothing illegal from the USG standpoint. The next chapter will discuss the  
 
Executive Branch which implements the President’s policies. 
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Chapter 5   
 
The Reagan Doctrine and the Executive Branch  
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
            The President is head of the Executive Branch of the USG which executes the  
 
laws that the Congress legislates.  The President also has some authority to make policy  
 
by issuing an Executive Order. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that President  
 
Reagan was very aware of all that was transpiring in southern Africa and Mozambique.  
 
There are eight (8) entries in the Ronald Reagan diaries (2007) that specifically mention  
 
Mozambique. The earliest entry was 1982, and the last entry was 1988. It can be  
 
concluded from the evidence and wording that President Reagan fully intended to support  
 
or at least show support for RENAMO, by encouraging FRELIMO Mozambique  
 
Governmental leaders to negotiate with the RENAMO leaders to obtain a political  
 
settlement to a) come out of the Soviet orbit, and b) end the internal civil war. The results  
 
of the political settlement would bring about an end to the Mozambique Civil War and  
 
bring an end to Soviet influence in Mozambique. 
     
     The President also appoints the cabinet secretaries to carry out his policies and the  
 
laws that Congress legislates. President Reagan initially appointed Caspar Weinberger as  
 
his Defense Secretary and Alexander Haig as his Secretary of State in 1981. After a year,  
 
Secretary Haig resigned and George Shultz was appointed until the completion of  
 
President Reagan’s term in 1989. President Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for  
 
African Affairs was Chester Crocker. He was an African expert, being a Professor at  
 
Georgetown University in Washington D.C. Bureaucratic politics played a part in  
 
Crocker’s confirmation process, because Crocker almost was not confirmed, not being 
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considered sufficiently ideological by the US Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse  
 
Helms, who held his nomination and confirmation until August 1981. 
 
     In the Executive Branch, there was tension between the Secretary of Defense (Caspar  
 
Weinberger) and Secretary of State (George Shultz) Since the Department of State  
 
emphasizes diplomacy to solve a critical incident and the Department of Defense  
 
prepares military options for the President, there can be bureaucratic conflict. As former  
 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote: Conflicts between secretaries of state and  
 
defense tend to be partly personality conflicts with the secretary of state usually, because  
 
that is his function, emphasizing diplomacy and the secretary of defenses’ responsibility  
 
is emphasizing military capability. Now both diplomacy and military capability are ways  
 
of dealing with national security. That was the rationale behind the establishing of the  
 
NSC in the first place. You would expect the secretary of state to argue against the use of  
 
force and the secretary of defense to argue for it. There is sometimes a situation in which  
 
the positions are the reverse of what you expect. This was what happened with Shultz and  
 
Weinberger for example. It is usually so, by the way, that the White House people  
 
overestimate the utility of military force. I think Shultz was one of those who also  
 
overestimated the value of military force. (Rothkopf, 2005, 229)  
 
5.2 President Reagan and Mozambique 
 
      President Reagan also was sympathetic to the plight of individual persons. He was not  
 
a mean person as many historians have made him out to be as Menges, (1988, 385)  
 
indicated. Menges (1988, 385) writes that President Reagan was a good natured and  
 
humored man. Reagan seemed to care deeply about the foreign policy goals that he  
 
espoused. This implies that President Reagan was able to think about using the carrot and  
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stick approach to Mozambique.   During the Mozambique drought of 1984 President  
 
Reagan seemed to think that US aid to Mozambique will further entice them out of the  
 
Soviet orbit. In his diaries, President Reagan (2007, 213) writes that on Wednesday,  
 
January 18, (1984) that “Sen. John Danforth has returned from his African trip. He  
 
brought over some slides of the starving people principally in Mozambique. He plead for  
 
immediate help for these people. The govt. of Mozambique had thrown its lot with the  
 
Soviets. Now the Soviets have failed them. I told our gang to get underway & we’ll ride  
 
to the rescue.”   
 
   President Reagan was also more supportive of anti-Communist regimes, some, like  
 
South Africa, despite its human rights record. Reagan (in Anderson, 2009, 35) was  
 
quoted as saying: “We don’t throw out our friends just because they can’t pass the “saliva  
 
test” on human rights. I want to see that stopped. We need people who recognize that  
 
philosophy. In Angola, for example, Savimbi holds a large chunk of Angolan Territory.  
 
With some aid, he could reverse the situation.” With regard to President Reagan’s  
 
anti-Communist stance, his position on anti-communism was very firm. He supported the  
 
Angolan UNITA and Jonas Savimbi, even when they supposedly burned down a Red  
 
Cross hospital and prosthetic factory. Reagan also supported the Nicaraguan Contra’s  
 
when they were suspected of committing atrocities, as well as the Philippines dictator  
 
Ferdinand Marcos. (Diggins, 2009, 223-224) Based upon this research, it would  
 
not be surprising that his firm anti-Communist position extended to apartheid South  
 
Africa.  
 
     President Reagan was involved with and in charge in international affairs more than  
 
many historians admit. According to Anderson (2009, 13) in Reagan’s Secret War that:  
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“…And when I’ve heard all that I need to make a decision, I don’t take a vote. I make the  
 
decision. Then I expect everyone of them, whether their views have carried the day or  
 
not, to go forward together in carrying out the policy.” Reagan’s diary makes several  
 
mention of these events. As President Reagan (2007, 303) wrote on Wednesday,  
 
February 27, 1985, “Geo Shultz came in with Bud. He was reporting on what our man is  
 
reporting from S. Africa about the Namibia and Angola situation. Angola has made an  
 
offer about sending Cuban troops home, but it’s not a good one. We’re proposing a  
 
counter which also has the approval of Savimbi-head of the UNITA faction, which is in  
 
revolution against the Angolan govt. He’s a good man & has offered a plan for peaceful  
 
settlement in Angola. We’re also stepping up our help to Mozambique: Some of our  
 
Congressmen and Sen’s. are upset by this since that country has been in the Soviet camp.  
 
What they don’t know is that Mozambique wants out of the Soviet connection.”  
 
     5.3 The State Department and Mozambique 
 
   As previously mentioned there was substantial bureaucratic division in the State  
 
Department over the Reagan Doctrine and Mozambique. It can be said that it was the  
 
CIA and DOD against the State Department.  The two Assistant Secretaries of State for  
 
Africa, Chester Crocker and Herman Cohen both comment about the problems between  
 
the State Department and the other governmental agencies about the Reagan Doctrine and  
 
Mozambique in particular. In High Noon in Southern Africa, Chester Crocker (1992, 249)  
 
wrote “In Washington, partisan strife over Mozambique became one of our biggest  
 
headaches during most of the second Reagan term. In my eight and a half years at the  
 
helm of the African bureau, no policy battle was more bitter. Few presidentially approved  
 
policies were more shamelessly undercut by people in the President’s own party, his own  
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administration and even his own White House Staff.”  Assistant Secretary of State  
 
Herman Cohen (2000, 181) writes in his book Intervening in Africa, “Before we could  
 
intervene in the fifteen-year old Mozambique civil conflict; we had to resolve the dispute  
 
within the US government as to who were the good guys and who were the bad guys.  
 
During the last two years of the Reagan Administration (1987-1988), when I was senior  
 
director for Africa on the National Security Council staff, bureaucratic tensions over  
 
Mozambique among the national security agencies were about the worst I had seen in  
 
thirty years.”   
 
    George Shultz was President Reagan’s Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989, after  
 
Alexander Haig left the office. Shultz (1993, 1112) reiterated the southern African  
 
objectives as given to him by President Reagan. The strategic objectives were:  
 
• reduced cross border violence,  
 
• a reduction of Soviet –Cuban meddling, an end to South African attacks on its 
vulnerable neighbors, and 
 
•  an end to internal conflicts fueled by racism and Marxist Dictatorships.  
 
Secretary Schultz also challenged the Brezhnev Doctrine in that there was no longer a  
 
reason for us, or anyone else, to accept the legitimacy of tyrannical rule: “So long as  
 
Communist dictatorships feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in the name of “socialist  
 
internationalism,” why must the democracies, the target of the threat, be inhibited from  
 
defending their own interests and the cause of democracy itself? How can we as a  
 
country say to a young Afghan, Nicaraguan, or Cambodian: “Learn to live with  
 
oppression; only those of us who already have freedom deserve to pass it on to our  
 
children.” (Rodman, 1994, 274)     However Secretary Shultz also makes it plain that DCI  
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Casey was playing his own politics when it came to aiding the anti-communist  
 
insurgents.  According to Schultz (1993, 1113) “Bill Casey’s pursuit of different foreign  
 
policy goals, using the CIA, as his platform and his source of influence, was also a  
 
continuing problem for Crocker and me as we pursued what had been approved  
 
administration policies.”  
 
   The former CIA Director Robert Gates (1997) notes that Shultz did support the Reagan  
 
Doctrine. Gates (1997, 339) wrote “On February 22 (1985), three weeks before  
 
Gorbachev became General Secretary, Shultz (the administration “moderate”) gave a  
 
speech in San Francisco in which he spelled out the real content of the “Reagan  
 
Doctrine”: insurgencies fighting against communist domination across the globe would  
 
have American help. While Shultz supported the Reagan Doctrine he was also pragmatic. 
 
When Mozambican President Machel came for his official visit to the US, was when the  
 
struggle for the policy toward Mozambique came to head. Shultz 1993, 1116) reported  
 
that the news came at a time when South Africa, with Bill Casey’s encouragement, was  
 
particularly vigorous in supporting South Africa’s surrogate force, RENAMO, against the  
 
Machel government. Shultz also accused the CIA and their covert action of undermining  
 
his diplomacy in Angola and Mozambique, and of pursuing their own agenda.  
 
(Gates, 1997, 337) 
 
5.3.1 The Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) Position on the Reagan 
Doctrine 
 
    The State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester  
 
Crocker opposed aid to the RENAMO except as an incentive to negotiate.  Crocker noted  
 
that when President Reagan took office there was no peace process at all underway in  
 
southwestern Africa. The quest for Southwest Africa’s independence was moribund;  
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South Africa sat seemingly unmovable on its side of the Angolan-Namibian border while  
 
some 30,000 Cubans sat across on their side of the same border. UNITA was fighting an  
 
apparently endless civil war. No one was talking to anyone else. (Sarkesian and Vitas,  
 
1988, 370) The State Department helped to broker the 1984 Nkomati Accord to bring  
 
peace between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique. Regional, and, to a lesser  
 
extent superpower considerations have been the basis of American policy towards  
 
Mozambique’s low-intensity conflict.  At the time, the US government’s thinking was  
 
that by endorsing the sovereignty of South Africa and Mozambique, hopefully the former  
 
would stop aiding RENAMO, thereby bringing an end to the war (Ofcansky, 1988, 118).  
 
     Later in 1985, American concern about Mozambique focused on that country’s role in  
 
the superpower rivalry.  The White House supported by the State Department hoped to  
 
“wean away” Mozambique from the Soviet Union by arranging a meeting between  
 
President’s Machel and Reagan, which occurred on 18 September.  In response many  
 
American Conservatives spoke out against what they perceived to be “a highly  
 
questionable policy” (Ofcansky, 1988, 118). The State Department further opposed  
 
the Reagan Doctrine as applied to RENAMO. “As far as aid for the RENAMO is  
 
concerned, US Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost told a  
 
group of reporters in Maputo on 18 December 1986 that the American Government did  
 
not support this organization.” (Ofcansky, 1988, 118). This would be consistent with the  
 
State Department’s engaging in diplomacy to resolve the situation between FRELIMO  
 
and RENAMO and to get Mozambique out of the Soviet orbit and into the western orbit 
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5.3.1.2 The State Departments objectives for the 1985 President Machel visit  
 
     While the State Department supported peace in the region, it differed on how to  
 
reach them. The State Department wanted to “wean” the FRELIMO government  
 
from the Soviet Union and communist bloc. (Mokoena (1993, 279) indicates that  
 
the State Department objectives were: 
 
1. Improve FRELIMO government image in conservatives’ eyes. 
 
2. Encourage continued adherence to the U.S. brokered Nkomati Accord with South 
Africa, which specifies non-interference in the other’s internal affairs 
(Mozambican support of the ANC; South African support of RENAMO) 
 
3. Encourage FRELIMO to negotiate power sharing with RENAMO 
 
4. Seek FRELIMO cooperation in achieving an Angola/ Namibia settlement 
 
5. Achieve a renewed CIA liaison presence 
 
6. Press FRELIMO toward serious economic reform and greater cooperation with 
the IMF and World Bank; and 
 
7. Moderate Mozambique’s anti-U.S. votes in the United Nations  
 
5.4 Impact of the State Department’s Gersony Report on the Executive Branch 
 
  As previously stated the Gersony Report, written by US State Department Officer  
 
Robert Gersony, inflamed the rhetoric between the State Department and the pro  
 
RENAMO lobby. Amid accusations of a State Department cover-up, Assistant Secretary  
 
of State Chester Crocker (1992, 250) maintained “Gersony spent weeks in the refugee  
 
camps ringing Mozambique, systematically interviewing their inhabitants in order to  
 
compile a profile of the conditions from which they had fled. When his horrifying results  
 
became available to top levels within the administration in April 1988, we quickly  
 
decided to brief the Congress and publish the report before it leaked and we faced  
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accusations of “suppressing “it. According to Crocker (1992, 250) the report painted a  
 
picture of rural catastrophe, forced labor, degradation of women and youth, and the death  
 
of perhaps 100,000 civilians; it was worse than we imagined RENAMO’s open and closet  
 
admirers in Washington made a fierce, but futile effort to discredit the report.” President  
 
Reagan was also briefed on the Gersony Report and there is evidence that he did modify  
 
his stance on RENAMO, but the report came toward the end of his administration.  
 
President Reagan (2007, 616) wrote in his diaries that on Tuesday, June 7 (1988) “NSC- 
 
Colin brought in an NSC board member Ambas. Cohen to give me a rundown on  
 
Mozambique & the Renamo. He’s really an expert & he convinced me we should not  
 
look kindly on Renamo. They are well organized & and in some sectors are very kind to  
 
the people but in others they pillage and massacre.”    
 
    Despite all the uproar about the complaints against RENAMO and the special interest  
 
groups opposing the State Department, President Reagan, somewhat, backed the State  
 
Department and their handling of the situation.  
 
    The Gersony report did not go over well with Congress. In addition to the Gersony  
 
Report, the views of State Department officials upset Congress. After Senators Dole and  
 
Helms initially held up the nomination of Melissa Wells to be Ambassador to  
 
Mozambique, because during her confirmation hearings, Wells (in Maren, 1987) called  
 
RENAMO “bandits, “President Reagan (2007, 498), again, commenting on  
 
Mozambique, wrote in his diaries that on Wednesday May 20 (1987) “And finally a  
 
problem with our designated Ambassador to Mozambique-Melissa Wells a Foreign  
 
Service Officer. Sen Helms is blocking her approval by Sen. Committee. I want her  
 
approved.”  Eventually Wells was confirmed as Ambassador to Mozambique even  
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though 28 Senators wrote a letter denouncing her (Maren, 1987, 2). 
 
5.5 The Defense Department and Mozambique 
 
     It is well known that President Reagan’s first Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger  
 
was very much in favor of the Reagan Doctrine and aiding anti-Communist resistance  
 
movements. This was because using indigenous forces would help stop the introduction  
 
of U.S. troops into combat zones. The US DOD was heavily involved operationalizing  
 
the Reagan Doctrine because military advisors maybe appointed to help train and advise  
 
the insurgents, plus military intelligence is very important to national security decision- 
 
making. The DODs main concern was rebuilding to possibly fight a war against the  
 
Soviet Union in the European Theater.  
 
   As to the appointment of hard- line Caspar Weinberger as the Secretary of Defense,  
 
Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen, acknowledges the closeness of  
 
President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger, Cohen (2000, 198) writes: “his  
 
bureaucratic tactic in 1987 was to avoid confronting DOD on the Mozambique issue,  
 
because it would have been unwise to take on Weinberger directly. He wielded  
 
considerable clout on national security issues, especially ones espoused by  
 
conservatives.”  Cohen (2000, 198) then played politics, writing “Instead I stirred up  
 
anxiety among conservative supporters of UNITA in the White House and the Congress,  
 
declaring continued US support for UNITA our first priority.” 
 
   Secretary Weinberger was a longtime friend and aide of President Reagan and also had  
 
a strong dislike for Communism. (Schweizer, 1994, xvii) After Secretary Weinberger was  
 
appointed as Secretary of Defense, he surrounded himself with other right wing  
 
conservative thinkers in the Defense Department including Under Secretary of Defense  
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(Policy) Fred Ikle, and Richard Perle, whom author Alan Weisman (2007, 66) called:  
 
“The Prince of Darkness” Assistant Secretary Richard Perle was a wily defense  
 
intellectual who wanted to take a tough anti-Soviet line on everything (Schweizer, 1994,  
 
44). Perle was appointed to the Assistant Secretary’s job after turning down other job  
 
offers in the Reagan Administration. As Weisman (2007, 66) wrote about Perle “The  
 
lure of a like-minded administration began to play on Perle’s ego and imagination. This  
 
was one of the opportunities that played to Perle’s strength: his ability to place those who  
 
shared his views in positions that mattered. While ideological opponents saw a dark  
 
conspiracy in this spreading of likeminded bureaucrats, the fact is virtually everyone  
 
who lands a job of any import in Washington is part of some sort of cadre-political,  
 
ideological, fraternal, or social.”  
 
    In early 1981, Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle convened a group of Pentagon  
 
specialists to put together a “defense guidance” that remains classified to this day. Parts  
 
of it that were supposed to contain information that started the changes known as the  
 
Reagan Doctrine. (Kengor, 2006, 72-73) While the Reagan Doctrine was applied with  
 
veracity to Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, with the insurgents receiving U.S. arms  
 
(like Stinger Missiles) there is so far no evidence that actual military or lethal aid was  
 
given to RENAMO.  The U.S. Congress also became involved in the issue, and directed  
 
the Defense Department not to give any aid to Mozambique in budget year1986, by  
 
cutting the aid, contained in the budget to Mozambique. This would indicate support for  
 
RENAMO and the decision for FRELIMO to engage them in peace talks to end  
 
Marxism-Leninism and end the civil war.  
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5.6 The CIA and the Reagan Doctrine 
 
    The State Department was charged with collecting, processing, analyzing and  
 
disseminating intelligence about the Soviet Union’s capabilities and intentions. In 1981   
 
President Reagan chose William Casey to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).   
 
Casey is generally considered to be the most powerful DCI since the founding of the CIA  
 
in 1947 (Schweizer, 1994, xvi, 14, Freidman, 2000, 453). Casey was known to have close  
 
personal ties with President Reagan, supported freedom fighters and most importantly  
 
had unimpeded access to him.  As Kengor (2006, 120) observes: “Because of his  
 
vehement anti-Communism and strategic insight, Reagan found a soul mate in Casey, a  
 
man who like Reagan saw the Soviet Union as vulnerable to pressure.  Reagan unleashed  
 
Casey, picking his brain for ideas, placing tremendous confidence in him, and then  
 
signing off on dangerous initiatives that exploited Soviet vulnerabilities.” DCI Casey also  
 
had influence on President Reagan’s national security decision-making process.  
 
Commenting on this, Kengor (2006, 120) maintained “He [Reagan] did this discreetly,  
 
often in closed-door meetings that involved only him, Casey, and the National Security  
 
Advisor (Clark in the most crucial years).  As Bill Clark (in Kengor, 2006, 120)  
 
acknowledged “Few of these initiatives were discussed at cabinet meetings. The president  
 
made his decisions with two or three advisors in the room”   
 
   Immediately after taking control of the CIA, Casey began looking at the vulnerabilities  
 
of the Soviet Union and the lack of CIA analysis. Casey, according to Gates (1997, 203)  
 
ordered the Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman: 
 
• To pay attention to the worldwide “intangible threat” to U.S. interests-propaganda 
attack, subversion, terrorism, espionage, “with special attention to the degree to 
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which it may be organized, supported, directed and coordinated by forces hostile 
to us in the world,” and 
 
• Casey wanted a new intelligence estimate on (a) economic forces in the world 
either as a threat to our security or in terms of the political leverage they might 
afford for or against us; and (b) “instabilities and the potential for developing 
instability in those areas of the world which are of geopolitical importance and 
other areas of special interests to us.”  
 
 According to Gates (1997, 202) Casey quickly put his finger on a serious deficiency in  
 
the CIA’s collection and analysis of the Soviet Union. Surprisingly as it may seem- 
 
shocking-in fact, while the Directorate of Operations collected information on Soviet  
 
covert actions around the world, the Soviets’ espionage activities against others (non- 
 
NATO), and their propaganda networks, these reports were regarded as “operational”-not  
 
substantive-were rarely shared with analysts; even more rarely was this information  
 
circulated outside the operations directorate. These were the tools of Soviet subversion,  
 
their efforts to destabilize Third World countries and we hardly paid attention. We  
 
tracked military and economic assistance and Soviet activities around the world. This  
 
reflected, all too often, a lack of background in Soviet history, a mind-set about Soviet  
 
behavior, and a lack of information from the clandestine service.” 
 
   CIA Director Casey called attention to the Soviet vulnerabilities in the third world  
 
client states. In a January 9, 1985 speech he said: “There are over 100,000 Soviet troops  
 
in Afghanistan, 170,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and 40, 000 Cuban troops in  
 
Africa. This is a worldwide military aggression directly and by proxy. That and the horror  
 
of it is the bad news. The good news is that the tide has changed. Today in Afghanistan,  
 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, to mention only the most prominent arenas,  
 
hundreds of thousands of ordinary people are volunteers in irregular wars against the  
 
Soviet Army or Soviet supported regimes. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s anti-Western  
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causes attracted recruits throughout the Third World, the 1980s have emerged as the  
 
decade of freedom fighters resisting Communist regimes.” (Rodman, 1994, 271)  
 
Mozambique can be interpreted to be part of this speech. 
 
   Director Casey was also considered to have rewritten his own presidential authority.  
 
This was especially in consideration in regards to Afghanistan although it can be inferred  
 
to general Soviet expansion. Casey had wanted to stretch the war’s [Afghanistan]  
 
ambition to a similar degree. “Unless U.S. policy is redesigned to achieve a broader  
 
attack on Soviet vulnerabilities it cannot restore independence to Afghanistan” Casey  
 
wrote in a classified memo to McMahon and other senior CIA officers on December 6,  
 
1984. Continuation of the current U.S. program will allow the Soviets to wear down the  
 
Afghanistan resistance at a cost affordable and tolerable to themselves.” He insisted that  
 
the CIA take a close look at the Pentagon’s latest proposals to provide satellite  
 
intelligence about Soviet targets in Afghanistan. Casey concluded: “In the long run,  
 
merely increasing the costs to the Soviets of an Afghan intrusion, which is basically how  
 
we have been justifying the activity when asked, is not likely to fly.” (Coll, 2004, 102) 
 
“Restoring independence to Afghanistan” was not a goal spelled out for CIA covert  
 
action in the January 1980 presidential finding renewed by President Reagan. Nor was it  
 
a possibility deemed plausible by many of Casey’s own Soviet CIA analysts. No longer  
 
would the CIA be content to tie the Soviets down, Casey was saying. They were going to  
 
drive them out. (Coll, 2004, 102) 
 
   The CIA under Director Casey was also constantly engaged in covert operations in  
 
southern Africa. While most of this was in Angola and South Africa, it cannot be ruled  
 
out that it was expanded to Mozambique. As former CIA Director Gates (1997, 560)  
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recalled: “Operationally it had important successes. The greatest of them all was the war  
 
in Afghanistan where, under CIA management, the United States and its partners  
 
funneled billions of dollars in supplies and weapons to the Mujahedin. The resistance was  
 
thus able to fight the vaunted Soviet army to a standoff and eventually force the political  
 
decision to withdraw. And both the costs and the stalemate had a real and broad political  
 
impact domestically in the Soviet Union. Similarly, covert actions in Angola and even in  
 
Nicaragua produced sufficient pressure on the Soviet clients to make them seek a  
 
political solution. Elsewhere in the Third World, CIA worked successfully with  
 
governments friendly to the United States to combat subversion by the Soviets or their  
 
surrogates.  This showed the value of covert operations and can be  
 
construed as showing the Reagan Doctrine was applied to Mozambique. After all the  
 
strategy was the same. DCI Casey was well known for his access to  
 
  President Reagan and it is possible that he discussed aiding RENAMO. This would fit in  
 
with his penchant for covert operations.  In March 1982, Casey (Scott, 1996, 22)  
 
observed that “it is much easier and less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for  
 
us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt  
 
the internal peace and economic stability of a small country.”  Casey (in Scott, 1996, 22)  
 
further explained that “the 1980s have emerged as the decade of the freedom fighters  
 
resisting communist regimes” and that the U.S. should aid them because they only “need  
 
modest support and strength of purpose from nations that want to see freedom prevail  
 
(Scott, 1996, 22-23).  While it is still unknown if the CIA actually provided covert aid to  
 
RENAMO, it is suspected, in fact, Casey also backed up his words with deeds, he shared  
 
intelligence with his South African counterparts in Pretoria (Schweitzer, 1994, 114) It  
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was thought that the intelligence was related to Cuban and Soviet movements,  
 
capabilities and intentions in southern Africa, especially South Africa and Angola.  
 
(Schweitzer, 1994, 114)  
 
     It is unknown whether or not the CIA had any assets in either the FRELIMO or  
 
RENAMO movements. This would have made knowing intentions and warnings easier.  
 
With the proper intelligence the politicians can make better decisions. In March 1984, a  
 
month after USSR President Andropov’s death, the Centre [KGB Headquarters] was  
 
taken by surprise when Samora Machel and the South African President P.W. Botha  
 
signed the Nkomati non-aggression agreement (so called after the town in Mozambique  
 
where the signing took place). Photographs of the tall figure of the notoriously short- 
 
tempered Botha, nicknamed die Groot Krokodil (The Great Crocodile) towering over the  
 
much smaller Machel seemed to symbolize the triumph of Pretoria’s bullying power. In  
 
return for FRELIMO’s agreement to cease providing bases for the ANC, Pretoria  
 
promised to withdraw support for RENAMO (though in reality, South African military  
 
intelligence continued to provide it with some covert assistance). A dismayed ANC  
 
declared that the agreement had surprised the progressive world! Soon afterwards N.V.  
 
Shishlin, foreign affairs consultant to the International Department (and later to  
 
Gorbachev), told the London Embassy and KGB residency in a private briefing that  
 
saving Mozambique was beyond Moscow’s power; its economy had virtually collapsed  
 
and FRELIMO was riven with internal rivalries (Andrews and Mitrokhin, 2004, 468)  
 
      It is known that the KGB had an asset named TSOM within the FRELIMO hierarchy,  
 
because according to Markus Wolf, (in Andrews and Mitrohkin, 2004, 467) the long  
 
serving head of the Stasi’s foreign-intelligence arm; “Internal power struggles in the  
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[FRELIMO] government were exacerbated by debates between the Soviet military and  
 
the KGB over the proper way to handle a conflict careering out of control.”   William  
 
Casey became ill in December 1986 due to a brain tumor. Even though he did not pass  
 
away from the brain tumor until May 1987, Casey was forced to resign, thus depriving  
 
President Reagan of a skilled DCI. Casey was temporarily replaced by Deputy Director  
 
Robert Gates until William Webster, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 
(FBI) became the new director. 
 
5.7 The National Security Council (NSC) 
        
       The National Security of 1947 authorized the NSC to assist the President with  
 
making national security policy and providing the president with recommendations to  
 
make a decision on a particular issue. The actual function of the NSC was to advise the  
 
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies  
 
relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and other  
 
departments of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the  
 
national security. (Menges, 1988, 385) The statutory members of the NSC at the time  
 
President Reagan was in office were: 1) The President, 2) The Vice-President, 3) The  
 
Secretary of Defense, and 4) The Secretary of State. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  
 
Staff served as the principal military advisor, while the Director of Central Intelligence  
 
served as the intelligence advisor.  President Reagan structured the NSC to support his  
 
policies. The NSC has both professional staffers and political appointees. It was at the  
 
NSC that the heart of bureaucratic politics took place.         
    
   The Reagan NSC played the strongest role in formulating policy and strategy. Inside  
 
the Reagan NSC were such conservative anti-communist staffers as John Poindexter,  
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Roger Robinson, Richard Pipes, Bill Martin, Donald Fortier, and Vincent Cannistaro.  
 
(Schweizer, 1994, xviii) President Reagan had many NSA during his term in office. By  
 
contrast President George Bush only had two during his eight years in office:  
 
Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley. 
   
    As it was focused primarily of the Soviet Union and eventually separating client states  
 
such as Mozambique from Soviet influence, it is important to review The NSC policy  
 
and strategy toward the Soviet Union with respect to separating the Soviet Union from its  
 
Third World clients, such as Mozambique 
 
• Covert financial, intelligence, and logistical support to the Solidarity movement in 
Poland that ensured the survival of an opposition movement in the heart of the 
Soviet empire 
 
• Substantial financial and military support to the Afghan resistance, as well as 
supplying of mujahedin personnel to take the war to the Soviet Union itself. 
 
• A campaign to reduce dramatically Soviet hard currency earnings by driving 
down the price of oil with Saudi cooperation and limiting natural gas exports to 
the west 
 
• A sophisticated and detailed psychological operation to fuel indecision and fear 
among the Soviet leadership 
 
• A comprehensive and detailed global campaign, including secret diplomacy, to 
reduce drastically Soviet access to Western high technology 
 
• A widespread technological disinformation campaign, designed to disrupt the 
Soviet economy 
 
• An aggressive high-tech defense buildup that by Soviet accounts severely strained 
the economy and exacerbated the resource crises (Schweizer, 1994, xix) 
 
Probably the most prominent staffer on President Reagan’s NSC was Richard Pipes. Of  
 
Polish origin and a prominent anti-Communist, who wanted to shatter the myth of  
 
Soviet invincibility. He is also identified as the author of NSDDs-32 and 75 (Schweizer,  
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1994, 69, 130-131) Again, a premium was placed on secrecy. To this date part of NSDD  
 
32 remains classified. 
 
    The Andersons (2009, 178) wrote in Reagan’s Secret War that: “At the end of his first  
 
term, President Reagan had one of the most powerful groups of advisers ever put together  
 
in the White House. They were smart, tough, and precise.”   
 
    However, according to CIA Director Gates (1997, 285), the National Security Advisor  
 
did not play such a role during the first six years of the Reagan administration, partly for  
 
structural reasons, partly because of deficiencies of those who would hold the job.  
 
Downgraded in 1981, a weak and often incompetent Reagan NSC removed from the  
 
bureaucratic equation a powerful protection for the President-a potent personal  
 
representative who could bring the national security mandarins together, develop  
 
agreements and compromise when possible, and crystallize disputes into manageable  
 
alternatives for presidential decision. During the first six years of the Reagan  
 
administration, there was no one at the NSC whom Cabinet Officers would keep  
 
regularly informed of their activities and who could, as necessary, coordinate those  
 
activities and make sure all were adhering to the policies determined by the President  
 
    According to Gates (1997, 285) the position of National Security Advisor to the  
 
President is a complex and difficult one in the best of circumstances. Presidents have  
 
been best served by individuals with substantive expertise and/or experience in the  
 
national security arena, practical policy and government experience, the complete  
 
confidence of the President, and the confidence of the other members of the national  
 
security team. Gates (1997, 285) maintained that this did not happen with President  
 
Reagan’s National Security Advisors and as a result there was more in-fighting,  
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quarreling, back-biting, and jockeying for advantage among the senior members of the  
 
Reagan national security team than in the Carter Administration.  This would definitely  
 
hamper presidential decision-making   All of this would unravel after the Iran-Contra  
 
Scandal became public and nearly brought down the Reagan Administration. As  
 
Rothkopf (2005, 258) wrote “The Reagan Administration produced six national security  
 
advisors. Of the first four, the one who was probably the smartest-Poindexter-lasted the  
 
shortest time and got into the most trouble; the one who was the least experienced-Clark- 
 
was probably the most successful; the one who was the best known and best liked in  
 
foreign policy circles-Allen-became a nonentity in the job; and the one who was the most  
 
competent-McFarlane-ended up evoking the tormented ghost of James Forrestal (The  
 
first US Secretary of Defense, who committed suicide), one of those most responsible for  
 
creating the post in which he served by attempting suicide in 1987 because he felt he had  
 
completely let down his commander-in chief. But it was the last two who redeemed the  
 
process and set the stage for the shape and function of the function of the Post-Cold War  
 
NSCs even as the Cold War itself was winding to an end.” 
 
5.8 Impact of the Iran-Contra Scandal 
 
     The Iran-Contra scandal of 1986/1987 during President Reagan’s second term (1985- 
 
1989) definitely impacted the veracity of the Reagan Doctrine by forcing many key anti- 
 
Communist hard line persons in President Reagan’s cabinet and the staff members  
 
instrumental in assisting with the creation and execution of the Reagan Doctrine to  
 
resign. Some were also indicted. While the story of Iran-Contra is not part of this study,  
 
the effects of the scandal of Iran-Contra definitely impacted the Reagan Administrations  
 
southern African region and Mozambique more than most observers give credit for. With  
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the key players gone, decisions to forcefully and fully implement the Reagan Doctrine  
 
could not be made.  
 
   The background of the scandal is that the Iran-Contra rebels was basically selling arms  
 
to the Iranian Regime in exchange for the release of Americans being held hostage by  
 
Islamic Terrorists in Lebanon. The proceeds from the sale of the arms were sent to the  
 
Nicaraguan Contras (The USG supported insurgency fighting to overthrow the pro-Cuban  
 
Sandinista Regime) The USG was prohibited by the U.S. Congress from aiding the  
 
Contras due to the Boland Amendment, which prohibited USG from aiding the warring  
 
parties in Central America. The Boland Amendment was the Central American  
 
equivalent of the Clark Amendment that affected Angola, which prohibited the USG  
 
from aiding UNITA (Sarkesian and Vitas, 1988, 396, 410-411).   
 
   Defense Secretary Weinberger, National Security Advisor Poindexter and National  
 
Security Council Staffer Oliver North were among the most prominent officials that were  
 
forced to resign along with several other Reagan aides who were more strident in  
 
implementing the Reagan Doctrine. The full extent of the cover up is not known to this  
 
day. President Bush used his presidential authority to pardon and legally protect from  
 
prosecution, many officials involved in this scandal While the Iran-Contra scandal  
 
controversy is still being debated; it was assumed that DCI William Casey seemed to be  
 
the only one in position with enough authority to bypass President Reagan and run a  
 
“rogue operation.” (Anderson, 2009, 322)   
 
    The Iran-Contra scandal was a turning point for the Reagan Administration and for the  
 
National Security Council system. For the President and his team, it was a black mark  
 
that they survived but never fully recovered from (Rothkopf, 2005, 247-248) The Iran- 
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Contra scandal happened just as the issue of aid to RENAMO and Mozambique was  
 
becoming more heated and events distracted President Reagan from making a decision  
 
and fully implementing the Reagan Doctrine. 
 
   5.9 Summary 
 
   Bureaucrats in the Executive Branch were split over the application of the Reagan  
 
Doctrine towards Mozambique. It was the CIA and the DOD against the DOS. The NSC  
 
was operating by itself and could not effectively unite the cabinet departments and get  
 
them on the same sheet of music. It was even the CIA vs. the CIA with Director Casey  
 
favoring aid to the resistance movements, while the career assistants were more cautious.  
 
The reasons for caution varied, but fear of war against the Soviet Union was mentioned.   
 
The CIA was also viewed as a rogue agency or any agency out of control. The NSC  
 
which was made up of members of each organization plus professional staffers would  
 
have been caught in the middle.  State Department officials assigned to the NSC would  
 
have been against the Reagan Doctrine, while Defense and CIA officials would have  
 
been for it. It is (still) unknown if the principals went to President Reagan with their  
 
recommendations for an actual decision on RENAMO, but the evidence suggests that  
 
since he told President Chissano to negotiate with RENAMO, despite all evidence to the  
 
contrary, some decision was reached. 
 
   The impact of the Iran-Contra scandal on the administration and its effect on the  
 
Reagan Doctrine cannot be overestimated. This had a devastating impact on the  
 
administration in senior personnel turn-over.  In 1987 several of President Reagan’s top  
 
advisors were forced to resign and/or were indicted as a result of the scandal. Secretary of  
 
Defense Caspar Weinberger, a conservative hardliner, was among them. This definitely  
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had an impact on the political advice given to the president regarding military support to  
 
and in support of covert operations. 
 
     The State Department was virulently opposed to aiding the RENAMO insurgents or  
 
“bandits” as US Ambassador to Mozambique Melissa Wells called them during her  
 
confirmation hearings. Menges (1988, 394) wrote about the State Department, quoting  
 
Henry Kissinger: “The outside believes a Presidential order is consistently followed out.  
 
Nonsense. I have to spend considerable time seeing that it is carried out, and in the spirit,  
 
the President intended. Inevitably, in the nature of bureaucracy, departments become  
 
pressure groups for a point of view. If the President decides against them, they are  
 
convinced some evil influence worked on the President. If he only knew all the facts he  
 
would have decided their way.” The next chapter will be an analysis of the Reagan  
 
Doctrine implementation. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Analysis of Implementation of the Reagan Doctrine 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
         It can be concluded by the analysis in previous chapters that a modified Reagan  
 
Doctrine was implemented toward Mozambique. Even though there is still no official  
 
declassified documentation of hard evidence, such as direct or indirect arms or lethal  
 
military aid transfers, to support this notion, President Reagan urging the FRELIMO  
 
political leadership to enter into negotiations with RENAMO to end the civil war and  
 
bring about a settlement advancing peace and stability in Mozambique can be viewed as  
 
recognizing the existence of RENAMO as an anti-Communist ally of the US.  Since the  
 
President formulates US foreign policy, this provides more evidence.  This would fit with  
 
the theory that President Reagan, while being an ardent anti-Communist, supported  
 
negotiations between Communist governments and anti-Communist movements with the  
 
purpose of forming governments that granted peoples basic freedoms. In Mozambique’s  
 
case this would be negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the purpose would  
 
be to form a power sharing government, possibly a government of national unity. A “full”  
 
Reagan Doctrine, (as opposed to a modified Reagan Doctrine, which aimed at arming and  
 
providing possible military aid to the RENAMO insurgents would have happened if the  
 
Iran-Contra scandal had not forced the resignation or indictments of the key foreign  
 
policy actors in the Reagan administration. The Iran-Contra scandal forced the  
 
resignation of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security Advisors  
 
Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, and several key CIA officials. This devastated  
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the administration’s strategic planning ability. This happened in 1985-1987 at the  
 
beginning of President Reagan’s second term and hamstrung Reagan’s ability to further  
 
implement foreign policy decisions. It appears that in asking FRELIMO to negotiate with  
 
RENAMO, Reagan overruled his State Department, who wanted nothing to do with  
 
RENAMO.   
 
     President Reagan left office in January 1989 and even though events carried over to  
 
the George H.W. Bush Administration, the USG’s strategy toward Mozambique  
 
eventually produced concrete results. In 1992, for example, the Rome Accords between  
 
FRELIMO and RENAMO were signed, which eventually led to, by all accounts, free and  
 
fair elections. The elections were supervised by the United Nations with civilian and  
 
military observers the presiding. The FRELIMO Government won the election, but  
 
RENAMO had a fairly good showing at 35% of the votes. This was to eventually dispel  
 
the myth that RENAMO were not merely “bandits”, but was a serious, legitimate  
 
political movement.  
 
   The USG’s strategy toward southern Africa, particularly towards Angola, Mozambique  
 
and South Africa took years to yield results. The fall of the Soviet Union and two US  
 
presidential administrations later, the strategy and means eventually resulted in a  
 
successful end. Other factors contributed to the success of this strategy. This includes, for  
 
example, the inability of both FRELIMO and RENAMO to win an outright  
 
military victory.  In addition the CIA Director Casey, for example, never stopped coming  
 
up with ideas-or forwarding those of others –for waging war against the Soviets more  
 
broadly, more aggressively and more effectively (Gates, 1997, 256). Casey’s strategy  
 
added pressure on the Soviet Union to negotiate with the USG on Soviet support to the  
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Third World Communist governments and ending the conflicts in Third World countries.   
 
The Reagan Doctrine essentially made the Third World, which would include  
 
Mozambique, a Soviet liability. This was a dramatic reversal from the USSR’s  
 
dominance in those countries in the1970s. 
 
6.2 Putting Pressure on FRELIMO to Start of Serious Negotiations 
 
    According to Ambassador Cohen (2000, 185): “To satisfy President Reagan’s  
 
desire to see FRELIMO-RENAMO negotiations begin, we decided to jump start the  
 
process by bringing Chissano to Washington for an official visit and exposing him to  
 
Reagan’s charm. Assistant Secretary Crocker, his principal deputy Charles Freeman, my  
 
deputy at the NSC Alison Rosenberg, and I worked out the details. Together we  
 
succeeded in getting Chissano invited for a working visit on 7 October 1987.”  
 
President Reagan, as indicated earlier, had a passionate dislike for Marxism- 
 
Leninism and the Soviet “experiment.” Reagan believed that Communist regimes were  
 
not “just another form of government,” as George Kennan (in Schweizer, 1994, xiii)   put  
 
it, but a monstrous aberration.  As confirmed in President Reagan’s diaries, he wrote  
 
that he urged President Chissano to negotiate with RENAMO.  The NSDDs signed  
 
by President Reagan can also be construed as supporting aid to the RENAMO  
 
insurgents.  As was also shown the Reagan Administration’s support for the SAG against  
 
the Cubans and Soviets can definitely be construed as support for RENAMO. Those who  
 
say that aid to the SAG did not constitute aid to RENAMO are wrong. Aiding the  
 
SAG, so as to keep pressure off their eastern flanks, by supporting the insurgency, was  
 
definitely aiding RENAMO. Aid to the SAG was primarily done before the 1986  
 
sanctions.  From a strategic point of view, aiding RENAMO would have forced  
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FRELIMO to battle the insurgents and militarily tied up FRELIMO. This would have  
 
freed the South Africa’s Government troops from being tied down along the  
 
Mozambique border.  
 
   While the President is the ultimate decision making authority in the US, he is also  
 
guided by advisors, and by either legislative actions enacted by the Congress, or judicial  
 
limits enacted by the US Supreme Court. There were no judicial actions concerning  
 
Mozambique. It can be deduced that President Reagan’s advisors were not  
 
following his policies to either the spirit or the letter of the law. 
 
    Secretary of State George Shultz was duty- bound to give President Reagan the best  
 
advice possible to make a decision. If Secretary Shultz and his Assistant Secretary of  
 
State for African Affairs Chester Crocker gave him the best advice toward Mozambique,  
 
then they did their duty. If the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary were misled by their  
 
own advisors regarding RENAMO and the Gersony Report, as indicated by Ambassador  
 
Cohen, then they had the duty to return to President Reagan and make corrected  
 
recommendations. 
 
    President Reagan’s DCI William Casey also was duty bound to give the best advice  
 
regarding the RENAMO movement for President Reagan to make a decision. If Casey  
 
either disregarded President Reagan’s orders or knowingly went ahead and supplied  
 
RENAMO, beyond the President’s orders, then he too, was disloyal. There was no law  
 
prohibiting support to RENAMO, like the Clark Amendment (until it was repealed in  
 
1985) which prohibited aid to UNITA or the Boland Amendment prohibited aid to the  
 
Nicaraguan Contras. As was previously mentioned there was no set of standards actually  
 
defining the Reagan Doctrine nor was it evenly applied to all countries that warranted it. 
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6.3 Reasons for President Reagan’s action toward Mozambique 
 
    The Reagan Doctrine did not have a published set of guidelines. It was implemented in  
 
countries such as Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua, each with different standards,  
 
strategies and results. President Reagan’s strategy toward southern Africa was to engage  
 
in “Constructive Engagement” to reduce Soviet and Cuban influence in the region and  
 
end the region’s civil wars. The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique were devastating  
 
toward the civilians. Reducing the Soviet and Cuban influence would aid in South  
 
Africa’s security situation, so the scourge of apartheid could be eventually dismantled. In  
 
the long run the Reagan Administration’s strategy worked. Despite all the bureaucratic  
 
infighting between the President Reagan and Congress, the President and special interest  
 
groups and in-fighting among the President’s staff, peace in the region would eventually  
 
come and the Soviet Union would disappear.  
 
    This was in spite of the early problems that RENAMO faced. Many in the State  
 
Department viewed RENAMO as “bandits,” and subordinate to the South African  
 
regime. Massie (1997, 499), amongst others reinforced this by observing “During the  
 
Rhodesian Civil War South Africa and Rhodesia setup bases for them in the eastern  
 
Transvaal, provided them with weapons, and unleashed them, RENAMO troops crossed  
 
into Mozambique at will and wreaked havoc with the economy by blowing up roads,  
 
bridges, power lines, and railways and by terrorizing tens of thousands of rural residents.”   
 
In 1992, elections were held in Mozambique. In 1994, elections were held in  
 
South Africa, which resulted in Nelson Mandela becoming South African President and  
 
the ANC gaining majority rule in Parliament. Mozambique did not have the same number  
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of Cuban and Soviet troops and advisors as Angola did. The Soviet Union did not  
 
prioritize support for FRELIMO and the Government of Mozambique.  Initially South  
 
Africa was concerned about the ANC bases in Mozambique. Actions by the SAG to  
 
destabilize the FRELIMO Government eventually brought South African President Botha  
 
and Mozambican President Machel to the negotiating table and the signing of the  
 
Nkomati Accords, which were brokered by the USG.   The issue of FRELIMO being a  
 
vanguard Marxist-Leninist Party dedicated to “Scientific Socialism” factored into  
 
President Reagan wanting RENAMO to negotiate with FRELIMO. While this was going  
 
on the key decision-makers in President Reagan’s cabinet were continuing with the  
 
mission to free southern Africa from Cuban-Soviet meddling and ending the region’s  
 
civil wars. Having FRELIMO negotiate with RENAMO, it was argued would achieve  
 
those goals. 
 
 
6. 4 Summary 
 
           It can be concluded that a modified Reagan Doctrine was implemented toward  
 
Mozambique. President Reagan wanted a negotiated settlement to the Mozambican civil  
 
war, as well as getting rid of the Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa. The  
 
only way to achieve this was by pressurizing the FRELIMO government to negotiate  
 
with RENAMO and possibly form a type of government of national unity. Both  
 
FRELIMO and RENAMO were not strong enough to gain an outright military victory.   
 
Until all of President Reagan’s records are declassified; there will probably be no  
 
documentation of hard evidence, such as arms transfers or other materiel going to  
 
RENAMO.  If any US or allied arms were sent through South Africa to RENAMO, it will  
 
be hard to document.  What is evident, however, is the fact that RENAMO was able to  
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wage an insurgency against FRELIMO from 1975 until the 1992 elections in  
 
Mozambique. Waging the insurgency CANNOT be done without materiel assistance. The  
 
insurgents needed food, arms, shelter, clothing, etc. Even if RENAMO obtained weapons  
 
from raids against FRELIMO, their strength was too great to obtain them all from hit and  
 
run raids. It is known that Rhodesia and South Africa supplied some weapons to  
 
RENAMO.    
 
    President Reagan urging the FRELIMO leadership to enter into negotiations with  
 
RENAMO to end the civil war and bring about a settlement advancing peace and stability  
 
in Mozambique can be viewed as recognizing the political existence of RENAMO.    
 
Those who say that aid to the SAG did not constitute aid to RENAMO are wrong. Aiding  
 
the SAG, to keep pressure off their flanks, especially if it freed South African troops from  
 
the border with Mozambique can be definitely seen as support for both South Africa and  
 
RENAMO. Supporting the insurgency, was definitely aiding RENAMO. US aid to the  
 
SAG was primarily done before the 1986 sanctions. 
 
   While the President is the ultimate decision making authority, she/he is also guided by  
 
his advisors, and by either legislative actions enacted by the Congress, or judicial limits  
 
enacted by the US Supreme Court. There were no judicial actions concerning  
 
Mozambique, so that is not a problem. It can be deduced that his advisors were not  
 
following his policies to either the spirit or the letter of the law.  Bureaucratic politics  
 
also prevented the President’s advisors from giving him accurate information for a  
 
decision. The Secretary and the Assistant Secretary were misled by their  
 
own advisors regarding RENAMO and the Gersony Report, as indicated by Ambassador  
 
Cohen, then they had the duty to return to President Reagan and make corrected  
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recommendations.   
 
  Regarding the CIA involvement.  When William Casey took over the CIA, the USSR  
 
believed that the US was suffering from not only the “Vietnam Syndrome, but also the  
 
“Angolan Syndrome.” (Andrew and Mitrohkin, 2005, 453)  Casey was determined to rid  
 
the CIA of the syndromes and bring them back into the world of covert operations. It is  
 
well known that the CIA under Casey supported South Africa with intelligence products.  
 
It is uncertain if the CIA provided lethal aid to the South African Security Services. This  
 
would have been in violation of US law, specifically the CAAA-1986. Never the less in  
 
the view of Iran-Contra, since the CIA supplied aid to the Nicaraguan Contras in  
 
violation of the law, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that DCI Casey either  
 
disregarded President Reagan’s orders or knowingly went ahead and supplied lethal or  
 
military aid to RENAMO, beyond the President’s orders. This can be deduced, as by the  
 
previous comment in Anderson’s book, where they wrote that DCI William Casey was  
 
the only administration figure capable of running a rogue operation. This can only be  
 
resolved when and if the CIAs files are ever opened to the public. However former CIA  
 
Director Gates (1997, 359) writes that “None of these or myriad or other covert  
 
propaganda activities determined the outcome of the Cold War. Some may have been  
 
counterproductive by making diplomatic efforts to reach out to the Soviets more  
 
complicated or harder. But most particularly those associated with publicizing the  
 
Soviets’ human rights record and the cases of specific individuals, and those in support of  
 
Poland’s Solidarity, served a useful purpose in my view in keeping the world’s attention  
 
on Soviet behavior and bringing pressure on them to change that behavior. We kept a  
 
bright worldwide spotlight on nefarious Soviet activities at home, in Eastern Europe, and  
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in support of Third World surrogates that otherwise have remained largely unknown or  
 
neglected.”  
 
Chapter 7 
 
 Summary 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
    President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981, vowing to fulfill his  
 
election promise to contain the spread of, and rollback, expansionist Soviet style  
 
Communism, particularly in African, Asian, and South American states.  According to  
 
the NSDDs, the strategy to implement the Reagan Administration policies were to be  
 
accomplished by:  
 
• Providing covert and overt aid to the anti-Communist resistance (guerrilla or 
insurgent) forces, 
•  which would enable them to destabilize the Soviet Union backed/supported 
governments.  
• This doctrine calling for the containment and reversing Communism would 
eventually be called the Reagan Doctrine.  
 
 Using Graham Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic political model, this study presented  
 
evidence to answer following question:  “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why  
 
was there a decision to only implement a very modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in  
 
Mozambique, instead of a full- blown effort, such as in Angola or Afghanistan?  The  
 
research showed that all prerequisites for a full implementation of the Reagan Doctrine,   
 
were met, but there was a reluctance to apply this doctrine with the veracity as compared  
 
to Afghanistan or Angola.   
 
   The research showed that despite bureaucratic politics and undermining of his own  
 
presidential polices, President Reagan did urge the FRELIMO governments of Presidents  
 
 112 
Machel and Chissano to negotiate with RENAMO to end the civil wars that had  
 
devastated Mozambique. The research showed special interests and lobbyists influenced  
 
government bureaucrats to view decisions to view the FRELIMO government and  
 
RENAMO resistance in a specific way and for specific reasons.  The research further  
 
showed that non-governmental organizations gave aid, albeit non-lethal aid, to  
 
RENAMO.  This investigation also measured how much influence the USG’s  
 
bureaucracy had on important national security decision-making processes. 
 
7.2 Summary of the main research findings and implications 
 
      The decision to apply a modified Reagan Doctrine toward Mozambique was based  
 
on President Reagan’s desire to meet the twin objectives of ending Soviet and Warsaw  
 
Pact influence in the southern African region and ending civil wars in the region,   
 
including that in Mozambique between governing   FRELIMO and the insurgent  
 
RENAMO movement. President Reagan also had to provide for the region’s  
 
security and stability to pursue a future peace in South Africa and gain independence for  
 
Namibia.  
 
   In order to accomplish his objectives, President Reagan had to get FRELIMO to  
 
negotiate with RENAMO to begin moving the peace process forward. In order to achieve  
 
this goal President Reagan would have to give either some incentive or punishment  
 
toward the ruling FRELIMO party. The threat of aid (military or non-military) to  
 
RENAMO would be a viable strategy toward achieving this objective. Eventually both  
 
FRELIMO and RENAMO would have to negotiate to bring the conflicts to an end. This  
 
was because neither movement was strong enough to win an outright military victory and  
 
the Mozambican civil war would just become a never ending stalemate. The conflicts  
 
 113 
would continue to bring death and destruction to Mozambique and the southern African  
 
region. President Reagan also had to get Mozambique out from the Soviet Bloc’s military  
 
and political influence, including the Cuban/ Soviet advisors, who trained the country’s  
 
vital security forces such as the police and the armed forces.   
 
   Another reason for these twin objectives to be met was to provide security for Republic  
 
of South Africa. South Africa had the siege mentality, the so called “Total onslaught”  
 
fearing being surrounded by Communist governments. In addition to Mozambique, the  
 
SAG was also fighting the Angolan army (The FAPLA), the Cuban Army and Soviet  
 
Advisors in Angola. To do this, there was aid given to the SAG, at least in the form of  
 
intelligence information on the status of communist forces. The research showed this  
 
intelligence was personally given to the SAG by US CIA Director William Casey. 
 
    It has been indicated that President Reagan personally asked the Mozambican  
 
leadership (President’s Machel and later Chissano) to negotiate with RENAMO to  
 
achieve peace and security in Mozambique. Since the president sets foreign policy, it can  
 
be shown that President Reagan’s intent was to achieve a negotiated settlement between  
 
FRELIMO and RENAMO. The threat of the USG aiding RENAMO was  
 
enough to eventually force the peace process to commence. Generally opposition to  
 
aiding the anti-Communist resistance movements involved fearing a general war (and  
 
possibly a nuclear war) against the Soviet Union.  
 
   Some of the movements and individuals supported by the USG did not have stellar  
 
human-rights records, yet being anti-Communist gained them USG support. Some of  
 
these insurgents were RENAMO, UNITA, the Nicaraguan Contras and Philippines’  
 
Ferdinand Marcos. It has been proved that President Reagan’s NSDD reflected an anti- 
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Communist view. Since these NSDD were prepared by his advisors, they can cast in a  
 
light most favorable to anti-Communism.    It has been proven that RENAMO was also a  
 
favorite for conservative US Congressmen including for example North Carolina  
 
Republican Jesse Helms and Kansas Republican Robert Dole. Senator Helms was the  
 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and using this position he actively  
 
lobbied for anti-Communist causes and movements. Being senior in Congress also  
 
counted as Senator Helm’s achieved his position through seniority. The US Congress has  
 
control of the governmental purse strings and through this approves all foreign aid. While  
 
conservative Congresspersons supported RENAMO, liberal Congresspersons generally  
 
opposed aid to RENAMO, simply because the movement was aligned with the South  
 
African apartheid regime. Even though the SAG allegedly cutoff all aid to RENAMO  
 
after the 1984 Nkomati Accord, the CBC still opposed RENAMO. The CBC was the  
 
prime mover for economic, political, and military sanctions against the SAG. These  
 
issues were based on liberal, conservative, urban, rural, and Democrat and Republican  
 
politics. 
 
     The Executive Branch of the USG had a mixed record on supporting the RENAMO  
 
movement. Some departments, especially the CIA were very active in supporting anti- 
 
Communist insurgents. With William Casey as the CIA Director, this followed the lines  
 
of President Reagan. As long as a movement was ant-Communist, that was all that  
 
counted. It did not matter what its human rights record was. It has been suggested that the  
 
CIA went “rogue” supporting insurgent movements beyond the scope of authorization or  
 
the law. Aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, for example, was provided despite being  
 
expressly prohibited by the Boland Amendment. Aid to the Afghanistan rebels, for  
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example, went beyond the scope and involved attacks in Termez, against the Soviet  
 
Union itself, even though the CIA denied that particular part (Coll, 2004, 161-162) There  
 
is no reason to believe that the CIA did not aid RENAMO, even though there was no  
 
specific authorization or prohibition. Civil servants or career officials at the CIA were  
 
also afraid that giving aid (primarily military or lethal) to anti-Communist insurgents  
 
would trigger a general or possibly nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union.    The US  
 
State Department was not very sympathetic toward the Reagan Doctrine and RENAMO  
 
and almost overruled President Reagan’s policies in regard to supporting anti-Communist  
 
movements in the Third World.  The US State Department also opposed the military aid  
 
to UNITA in Angola.  Both Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs Chester  
 
Crocker (1992, 249) and Herman Cohen (2000, 181) confirmed that bureaucrats tried to  
 
undercut President Reagan’s political positions. Chester Crocker, a former professor at  
 
Georgetown University was very much opposed to RENAMO, but still seemed neutral  
 
toward the Reagan Doctrine. It would fit that he supported threatened possible  
 
implementation of the Reagan Doctrine, as an incentive for the insurgency to negotiate a  
 
diplomatic settlement.  
 
    Non-governmental organizations were most vocal in their support for RENAMO  
 
and pressured the Reagan Administration to provide all kinds of aid to RENAMO  
 
publicly, including military and lethal aid. The most vocal NGO was the Heritage  
 
Foundation which published a series of papers supporting RENAMO.  The papers were; 
 
1. “In Southern Africa, The State Department Bets Against the Reagan Doctrine 
 (February 12, 1988) 
 
2. “The Controversial State Department Report on Mozambique (5/4/88) 
 
Other NGOs donated monetary and non-lethal aid to RENAMO. It would be prohibited  
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by US law for an NGO to give lethal aid to a foreign movement. Giving aid would be the  
 
highest form of assisting a cause that the organization believed in.  
 
At the end of Reagan’s successor’s (President George H. W. Bush’s’) term, the  
 
Rome Accords ending the Mozambique civil war would be signed in October 1992 by  
 
FRELIMO and RENAMO. The UN would send a peacekeeping/ security force to  
 
Mozambique. Eventually free and fair elections would be held in 1994 and FRELIMO  
 
would emerge the undisputed winner. RENAMO accepted the elections and also carried a  
 
significant percentage (35%) of the vote. This established political legitimacy for both  
 
political parties.  This significant percentage would dispute the previous U.S. State  
 
Department’s view that RENAMO was not a legitimate political organization.  
 
7.2.1 The Significance of this Research  
 
      The significance of the research cannot be overstated. The main significance is  
 
that the Reagan Doctrine, while being successful, was not a recipe for the outright  
 
military defeat of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union’s political allies in southern  
 
Africa.   This is significant because almost to a person, President Reagan’s advisors  
 
agreed that the USSR must be confronted, but they were just not sure how to accomplish  
 
it (Strategy), The resources to accomplish this (Means) and how to do it (Ways).  
 
Bureaucratic politics were to play a big part in how, when and where to implement the  
 
Reagan Doctrine and the logistics needed to accomplish this. In sum, while the US  
 
politicians decided that the Soviet Union needed “bleeding,” they were just not sure  
 
where, when and how to do it.  
 
   All of the communist countries subjected to the Reagan Doctrine including  
 
Mozambique had different characteristics. The primary way to accomplish the Reagan  
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Doctrine was the anti-communist “Freedom Fighter.” Mozambique was to be the most  
 
controversial decision. This was due to the “Freedom Fighters” and without a doubt  
 
RENAMO was subject to the most heated debate.  While it has been shown proved that  
 
President Reagan was a devoted anti-communist; he also realized that there were  
 
situations where the communist governments (like FRELIMO) and anti-communist  
 
insurgents (like RENAMO) could not possibly win outright military victories. The death  
 
and destruction would go on and on, as in a stalemate. Even more intensive aid to the  
 
anti-communist insurgencies, such as UNITA, did not result in outright military victories.  
 
The best the USG could hope for was political negotiations with the objective of  
 
including ALL parties in the government, or at least securing anti-Communist parties’  
 
participation in multi-party democratic elections. President Reagan’s successor President  
 
Bush proved this when he went on a tour of Poland and Hungary in 1989 and urged the  
 
US backed Polish Solidarity labor union to agree to serve with, instead of replace, the  
 
Polish Communist Party. This was fiercely denounced by the Polish Solidarity Union  
 
(Sebestyen, 2009, 301-311) Military force or aid is to be used to supplement, not supplant  
 
diplomacy. This was proved when FRELIMO and RENAMO signed the Rome Accords  
 
in 1992 ending the wars. In the aftermath FRELIMO won the 1992 elections fair and  
 
square and this was under the supervision of the UN and foreign election monitors. 
 
     Another significance of the research is that it proves that President Reagan was  
 
involved in making foreign policy. It has been argued that President Reagan was “out of  
 
touch,”  “hands off,” could not make a decision, etc. This is patently false. His own  
 
record contradicts this argument. It has been proved that he personally was involved in  
 
asking Mozambican Presidents Machel and Chissano to negotiate with RENAMO. He  
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has also written in his diaries about what foreign policy actions he took. This does not  
 
suggest a hands off approach.  While it has been shown that President Reagan was a  
 
hands on foreign policy President, it has also been shown that some of his advisors did  
 
not serve him well. Iran-Contra was the high point of this argument. It almost brought  
 
down his administration. Top officials including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
 
and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane were forced to resign over this. These  
 
actions forced President Reagan to lose the advice of individuals that he trusted for years  
 
and had served him since he was Governor of California from the 1967 to 1975. This  
 
leads into the argument on whether or not the CIA went rogue in Mozambique as it did in  
 
Nicaragua. It has been determined that the CIA provided aid to the Nicaraguan Contras  
 
when it was expressly banned by law. There is no reason to believe that this was not the  
 
case in Mozambique. The RENAMO movement was very well equipped and while they  
 
were not able to militarily defeat FRELIMO, they were able to hold and control large  
 
areas of the country. This would not be able to be done without some lethal military  
 
assistance. 
 
   The final significance of the study is that it shows that bureaucrats do act in their own  
 
interests and appoint officials who implement their views and visions. The Reagan  
 
Administration came into office with the express promise to roll back Soviet backed  
 
Communist governments in the Third World. President Reagan appointed political  
 
officials that he knew were in line with his view of achieving this objective. But since  
 
each individual is different, tensions resulted, not from wanting to achieve the objective,  
 
but how to do it. Hard liners such as Caspar Weinberger, William Casey, Richard Pipes  
 
and Fred Ikle prove this. Career bureaucrats, such as those at the CIA, demonstrated  
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reluctance to aid the anti-communist guerillas for fear of starting a war with the Soviet  
 
Union.   
 
7.3 Further Suggestions for Study 
 
    In order to fully comprehend the situation in the southern African region during the  
 
Cold War, there are other studies that must be done to fill gaps in the knowledge.  There  
 
are several possible involved topics that requires further study in this area. This list  
 
primarily covers the period 1974-1992. Some possible research titles in the area for study  
 
are: 
 
7.3.1. The Strategic Economic Situation in Southern Africa 
 
       What was the political decision-making process that led to the Soviet Union  
 
Government not (partially or fully) integrating (and making full economic partners)  
 
Mozambique and Angola into the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)? The  
 
reason for this investigation is that the economies in southern Africa were very backward,  
 
just coming from being Portuguese colonies. The Portuguese had not prepared the  
 
colonies for liberation and there were a multitude of problems. There was no way that  
 
Angola and Mozambique were ready for Communism/Socialism, when they were just an  
 
agricultural society, as well as a commodities supplier to the industries of Europe. It  
 
would be insightful to study why the Soviet Union was not willing to integrate Angola  
 
and Mozambique into their economic fold and provide economic, in addition to military  
 
aid. This would have had the advantage of reducing Angola and Mozambique’s  
 
dependence on South Africa since the FLS were totally dependent on South Africa as the  
 
regional economic power. This was true with transportation. The Soviet Union did not  
 
supply aircraft necessary to conduct an airlift or trains necessary to conduct line or local  
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haul operations. The Soviet Union did nothing to challenge the economic hegemony and  
 
maybe even prolonged the wars in southern Africa by not doing enough to “go after  
 
South Africa.”  It was known that the Soviet Union was never very generous with  
 
economic aid, or at least as generous, as they were with military aid. Military aid can  
 
only go so far, because once the wars are negotiated and settled, the economic progress  
 
must begin to settle the peace. 
 
7.3.2 The Strategic Military Situation in Southern Africa: 
 
   Why did the Soviet Union not exploit the gains it made with the liberation of  
 
Mozambique and instead focus on the Angolan conflict? The Soviet Union could have  
 
had better political mileage out of Mozambique than Angola. Witness the fallout from the  
 
Robert Gersony Report (Crocker, 1992, 250) There was never any type of Gersony  
 
report written about UNITA even though the USG banned aid to UNITA between 1976  
 
and 1985 through the Clark Amendment. A separate investigation on why the Soviet  
 
political leadership not capitalize on the Gersony report would also be in order.  
 
          The Soviet Union and Cubans focused on Angola, but Mozambique was wide open  
 
politically, economically and militarily for the communists taking. Mozambique was also  
 
logistically closer to the Soviet Union, so the lines of communication would not be as  
 
long, along the Indian Ocean. While Cuba was closer to Angola, they were both totally 
 
dependent on the Soviet Union for their armaments, so it would not matter whether the  
 
armaments came from Cuba or directly from the Soviet Union. Mozambique became  
 
independent of Portugal before Angola, even if it was only five months (June 1975 versus  
 
November 1975) The only political party in Mozambique was FRELIMO. It has been  
 
determined that RENAMO was not formed and organized until after the FRELIMO  
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government was in power, unlike Angola where the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA were  
 
engaged in a full scale civil war prior to the November 11, 1975 independence date. Had  
 
the Soviet Union engaged Mozambique economically, politically and militarily, as they  
 
did Ethiopia and Somalia, then the whole eastern coast of Africa could have become  
 
“Sovietized.” In addition the Soviet Union was always using propaganda offensives  
 
against the west, but for some reason they never capitalized on the US State  
 
Department’s Gersony report.  
 
   This was a USG report which condemned RENANO. It should have been high on the  
 
Soviet Union’s targets of opportunity. The investigation should also focus on the amazing  
 
lack of Soviet strategy toward southern Africa. There was effectively no strategy 
 
between the Soviet Union, their African allies, and the Cuban Government. This leads to  
 
the next possible investigation. 
 
7.3.3 The USGs recognition of Mozambique’s independence, but not Angolan 
independence 
 
    Angola was not recognized until President Bill Clinton took office in 1993. Why did  
 
the Carter and George H.W. Bush’s Administration not recognize Angola? Why did  
 
special interests like the CBC, for example, not apply more pressure to the Carter  
 
Administration or did they and the Carter Administration resist the CBC? What role did  
 
the special interest groups, for example, TransAfrica play in the eventual recognition of  
 
Angola?  This is probably the most interesting investigation to undertake for US scholars.  
 
It would be interesting to understand President Fords and the US State Department’s  
 
thinking and decision-making process to understand why Mozambique was immediately  
 
recognized on June 25, 1975, but not the MPLA government in Angola. The  
 
circumstances were virtually identical.  
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   Both were Portuguese colonies released after the Portuguese Armed Forces launched a  
 
coup against Prime Minister Caetano. Both become Socialist (Communist) countries,  
 
both were backwards. While FRELIMO was not “created” until 1976, the Ford  
 
Administration could have sought to counter FRELIMO with aid, instead of letting it go  
 
initially into the Soviet orbit.  It is well known that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger  
 
was behind the US efforts to install the FNLA in Angola, and later it would be UNITA  
 
after the FNLA military defeat, but nothing of the sort happened in Mozambique.   
 
    7.3.4 President Ford’s engagement with southern Africa  
  
    President Ford was hesitant when it came to defending South Africa’s position in the  
 
region, yet President Reagan was not. This investigation would focus on why President  
 
Ford let Angola “slip away” into the Communist orbit and whether or not the Ford  
 
Administration really backed South Africa’s invasion of Angola during “Operation  
 
Savannah.” This is supposedly the whole crux of the argument that led the South African  
 
Government to launch Operation Savannah.  
 
     President Ford was not a caretaker president or a do nothing president (DeFrank,  
 
2007, 5). While Ford did lose the presidential election to Jimmy Carter in 1976, it was  
 
not by a wide margin, such as the 1972 reelection of President Richard Nixon or the 1980  
 
and 1984 Ronald Reagan wins. Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan vigorously fought  
 
for aid to the FNLA and UNITA during the 1976 Republican presidential primary.  
 
President Ford could have capitalized on this and probably prevented the Clark  
 
Amendment, banning military aid to insurgent movements in Angola, from even  
 
happening in the first place. Even President Carter was not in favor of the Clark  
 
Amendment, because it encroached on Executive Branch authority. 
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     It would be insightful to investigate why President Ford was not more aggressive in  
 
forcing the Soviet Union to “crack down” on Cuban adventurism. The Soviet Union  
 
was making tremendous gains from détente, and was not willing to give it up. Even  
 
during the height of the Middle East Crises, (the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Soviet  
 
Union did not fully back Egypt and Syria in their invasion of Israel at the expense of  
 
détente.  President Reagan did not hesitate to stand up for South Africa, why did  
 
President Ford not do the same? Another significant point is that since the President is  
 
responsible for setting foreign policy, did he direct the US State Department to recognize  
 
Mozambique? 
 
7.3.5 The Soviet View of the Reagan Doctrine 
  
   An investigation to find out why or how the Soviet Union reacted to the Reagan  
 
Doctrine in southern Africa and Mozambique would also be in order.  This would fill a  
 
knowledge gap. While most of the Reagan Doctrine’s emphasis was focused on  
 
Afghanistan and Angola, it can be reasoned that comments regarding the doctrine can be  
 
applied to southern Africa and specifically Mozambique. Rodman wrote: Two Soviet  
 
writers in 1988 conceded the point, citing the $8 billion figure for Afghanistan alone: The  
 
USA skillfully exploits the fact that in “low-intensity conflicts” it is much cheaper to  
 
support the guerillas than the government…The USSR spent on military operations in  
 
Afghanistan five billion rubles annually, while the USA spent not more than one billion  
 
dollars annually on its support for the Afghan anti-governmental forces, or almost six to  
 
eight times less. According to Western estimates, approximately the same ratio of  
 
American and “induced” Soviet expenditures exists in conflicts involving Nicaragua,  
 
Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and Angola. (Rodman, 1994, 284) 
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ADDENDUM A.  Timeline for Important Events for the Government of 
Mozambique, RENAMO and the Cold War 
 
In order to better understand the events between the US, USSR, and Mozambique this 
timeline is included: 
 
1490s- Portugal begins the colonization process of what today is Mozambique 
 
1885-1890- “Scramble for Africa” and the Berlin Conference- Colonial powers “divide” 
up the African Colonies. Portugal retains Angola and Mozambique in southern Africa. 
Administers Mozambique until 1975. 
 
1945-September-Historians agree this is the beginning of the Cold War. 
 
1962- Initial guerilla/ insurgency training for what will become FRELIMO starts in 
Algeria 
 
1964- FRELIMO starts war of War of National Liberation against Portugal 
 
1969- February- Eduardo Mondalane is assassinated. There are still questions as to who 
actually carried out the assassination (Portugal or FRELIMO) 
 
1970- February- Samora Machel becomes the FRELIMO Leader 
 
1974- April 25- The Portuguese Government of Antonio Spinola is overthrown 
 
 September 6 - The Lusaka Accords are signed by Portugal, granting Mozambique 
independence in 1975. 
 
1975- June 25- Mozambique Independence- The Portuguese Government turns over 
Mozambique to FRELIMO 
  
 US Government led by President Gerald Ford establishes diplomatic relations 
with Mozambique. President Ford nominates Williard A. DePree to become Ambassador. 
 
 RENAMO is formed by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to 
begin an insurgency against FRELIMO. The original purpose of RENAMO was to 
provide relief for Rhodesia against Zimbabwean guerillas operating against the Ian Smith 
white-minority government. Andre Matsangaissa becomes the first leader 
 
1977- March 31- Mozambique signs a 20 year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with 
the Soviet Union 
 
1979- June-RENAMO Leader Andre Matsangaissa is killed leading a raid.  
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Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe. South Africa will begin backing and funding RENAMO to 
keep Mozambique unstable and provide a buffer for South Africa.  
 
1980- Orlando Cristina becomes the Secretary General of RENAMO  
November- Ronald Reagan is elected 40th President of the United States 
 
1981- January 20- Ronald Reagan is sworn in as President of the United States 
 
 August- RENAMOs “Manifest and Programme” appears-This describes 
RENAMOs political agenda.  
 
1982- May 20- President Reagan issues NSDD 32, U.S. National Security Strategy. 
Included in this NSDD is how the U.S. will deal with regional conflicts like southern 
Africa. 
15 December-President Reagan meets with Portuguese Prime Minister Francisco 
Pinto Balsemao, who expresses doubt that Angola and Mozambique would continue to 
maintain relationships with the USSR. 
 
1983- January 14- President Reagan issues NSDD 75- U.S. Relations With The USSR. 
This NSDD mentions limiting Soviet influence and aiding resistance movements in the 
Third World.  
 
15 September- President Reagan meets with Portuguese President Antonio dos 
Santos Eanes, who maintains that the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and 
Angola were ready to move away from Soviet influence  
 
1984- Evo Fernandes becomes Secretary General of RENAMO after Orlando Cristina is 
assassinated. 
 
March 16- The Nkomati Accords are signed between Mozambique and South 
Africa 
 
 November 6- President Ronald Reagan is elected to a second four-year term. 
 
1985- September 7-President Reagan issues NSDD 187- U.S. Policy Toward South 
Africa.  This NSDD articulates President Reagan’s strategy toward peace and stability in 
the region. The NSDD also articulates President Reagan’s strategy for ending apartheid 
in South Africa.  
 
  
September 19-President Reagan meets with Mozambique President Samora Machel of 
Mozambique at the White House.  Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano accompanies 
Machel to Washington DC. 
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September 20- Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger meets with Mozambique 
President Machel 
 
1986- February 10- President Reagan issues NSDD 212- United States Policy Toward 
Angola. This NSDD updates President Reagan’s strategy toward the southern African 
region and Angola in particular. 
 
October 16- The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAA) 1986 is enacted over 
President Reagan’s Veto 
 
October 16- President Samora Machel dies in a plane crash. Foreign Minister Chissano 
becomes President 
 
December 1986-January 1987- CIA Director William Casey Falls in with a brain tumor 
and is forced to resign due to ill health. Deputy CIA Director Robert Gates is appointed 
Acting CIA Director. 
 
1987- May 7- President Reagan issues NSDD 272- United States Objectives In Southern 
Africa. This NSDD updates President Reagan’s objectives and strategy in the southern 
African region 
 
 May 7-President Reagan also issues NSDD 274- United States Policy Toward 
Angola. This NSDD updates US policy toward Angola 
 
 October 5- President Reagan meets with Mozambique President Joaquim 
Chissano at the White House 
 
1988- April 16- The Gersony Report comes out 
 
June 7- President Reagan briefed on the Gersony Report by the NSC 
 
November- George Bush is elected 41st President of the United States. 
 
1989- January 20- George Bush becomes the 41st US President 
 
1992-October 4-Rome Peace Accords signed by FRELIMO and RENAMO ending Civil 
War. 
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ADDENDUM B.  Key Persons involved in the Reagan Doctrine and Mozambique: 
 
Mozambique 
 
a. FRELIMO 
 
1. Chipenda, Alberto- FRELIMO Minister of Defense 
2. Chissano, Joaquim-President of Mozambique after the death of Samora Machel in 
1986 
3. Machel, Samora-President of Mozambique until his death in 1986 
 
b. RENAMO 
 
1. Cristina, Orlando- Secretary General of RENAMO (Murdered in 1983) 
2. Dhlakama, Alfonso- President of RENAMO 
3. Lemane, Artur-RENAMO Representative to the United States 
4. Andrew Matsangaissa-President of RENAMO (Killed in 1979) 
5. Seffu, Julius-RENAMO Representative to the United States 
6. Serapiao, Luis-RENAMO Representative to the United States 
 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
1. Andropv, Yuri, Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union- 
1982-1984, former Chairman of the KGB 
2. Brezhnev, Leonid-Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1964-
1982 
3. Chernenko, Constantin-Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union- 
1984-1985 
4. Gorbachev, Mikhail-Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union- 
1985-1991 
 
United States of America 
     
      1.   Allen, Richard-National Security Advisor -1981-1982 
2.   Bush, George-President of the United States-1989-1993 
3.   Carlucci, Frank-Secretary of Defense-1987-1989 
4.   Casey, George-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency-1981-1987 
5.   Clark, Richard- National Security Advisor-1982-1983 
6.   Cohen, Herman-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs-1989-1993 
7.   Crocker, Chester-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs-1981-1989 
8.   Haig, Alexander-Secretary of State-1981-1982 
9.   Helms, Jesse-Republican Senator from North Carolina, Chairman of the Senate      
       Foreign Relations Committee 
10.  McFarlane, Robert “Bud”- National Security Advisor-1983-1985 
11.  Poindexter, John-National Security Advisor-1985-1987 
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12.  Powell, Colin-National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
13. Reagan, Ronald-President of the United States-1981-1989 
14. Schultz, George- Secretary of State-1982-1989 
15. Weinberger, Casper-Secretary of Defense-1981-1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 
 
ADDENDUM C   National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) Documents involving 
Southern Africa  
 
1.  NSDD 187-US Policy Towards South Africa 
2.  NSDD 212-US Policy Towards Angola 
3.  NSDD 272-US Objectives in Southern Africa 
4.  NSDD 273-US Policy Toward South Africa 
5.  NSDD 274-US Policy Toward Angola 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
